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Single Idea 14096
[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 10. Monotonicity
]
Full Idea
The failure of monotonicity is a general feature of explanatory relations.
Clarification
In 'monotonic' logics, what is proved stays proved
Gist of Idea
Explanations fail to be monotonic
Source
Gideon Rosen (Metaphysical Dependence [2010], 05)
Book Ref
'Modality', ed/tr. Hale,B/Hoffman,A [OUP 2010], p.116
A Reaction
In other words, explanations can always shift in the light of new evidence. In principle this is right, but some explanations just seem permanent, like plate-tectonics as explanation for earthquakes.
The
29 ideas
from Gideon Rosen
8912
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Nowadays abstractions are defined as non-spatial, causally inert things
[Rosen]
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8913
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Chess may be abstract, but it has existed in specific space and time
[Rosen]
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8914
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Sets are said to be abstract and non-spatial, but a set of books can be on a shelf
[Rosen]
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8918
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Functional terms can pick out abstractions by asserting an equivalence relation
[Rosen]
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8919
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Abstraction by equivalence relationships might prove that a train is an abstract entity
[Rosen]
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8917
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The Way of Abstraction used to say an abstraction is an idea that was formed by abstracting
[Rosen]
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8916
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Conflating abstractions with either sets or universals is a big claim, needing a big defence
[Rosen]
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8915
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How we refer to abstractions is much less clear than how we refer to other things
[Rosen]
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18850
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'Metaphysical' modality is the one that makes the necessity or contingency of laws of nature interesting
[Rosen]
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18849
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Metaphysical necessity is absolute and universal; metaphysical possibility is very tolerant
[Rosen]
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18848
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Something may be necessary because of logic, but is that therefore a special sort of necessity?
[Rosen]
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18852
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A Meinongian principle might say that there is an object for any modest class of properties
[Rosen]
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18851
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Pairing (with Extensionality) guarantees an infinity of sets, just from a single element
[Rosen]
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18853
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A proposition is 'correctly' conceivable if an ominiscient being could conceive it
[Rosen]
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18854
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The MRL view says laws are the theorems of the simplest and strongest account of the world
[Rosen]
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18855
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Combinatorial theories of possibility assume the principles of combination don't change across worlds
[Rosen]
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18858
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Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another
[Rosen]
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18857
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Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds
[Rosen]
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18856
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Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things
[Rosen]
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14092
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Philosophers are often too fussy about words, dismissing perfectly useful ordinary terms
[Rosen]
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14093
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An 'intrinsic' property is one that depends on a thing and its parts, and not on its relations
[Rosen]
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14094
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The excellent notion of metaphysical 'necessity' cannot be defined
[Rosen]
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14095
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Facts are structures of worldly items, rather like sentences, individuated by their ingredients
[Rosen]
|
14096
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Explanations fail to be monotonic
[Rosen]
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14097
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Things could be true 'in virtue of' others as relations between truths, or between truths and items
[Rosen]
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14100
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Figuring in the definition of a thing doesn't make it a part of that thing
[Rosen]
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14098
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An acid is just a proton donor
[Rosen]
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14099
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'Bachelor' consists in or reduces to 'unmarried' male, but not the other way around
[Rosen]
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14101
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Are necessary truths rooted in essences, or also in basic grounding laws?
[Rosen]
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