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Single Idea 14207
[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
]
Full Idea
If the number of cats happens to equal the cherries, then it follows from the theory of models that there is a reinterpretation of the entire language that leaves all sentences unchanged in truth value while permuting the extensions of 'cat' and 'cherry'.
Gist of Idea
If cats equal cherries, model theory allows reinterpretation of the whole language preserving truth
Source
Hilary Putnam (Reason, Truth and History [1981], Ch.2)
Book Ref
Putnam,Hilary: 'Reason, Truth and History' [CUP 1998], p.44
A Reaction
This horrifying result seems to come simply from the fact that there is an isomorphism between two models, which in turn seems to rest largely on the cardinality of the models. There seems to be something wrong with model theory here (?).
Related Ideas
Idea 14205
The sentence 'A cat is on a mat' remains always true when 'cat' means cherry and 'mat' means tree [Putnam]
Idea 14206
There are infinitely many interpretations of a sentence which can all seem to be 'correct' [Putnam]
Idea 14212
A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis]
The
22 ideas
from 'Reason, Truth and History'
4714
|
Putnam's epistemic notion of truth replaces the realism of correspondence with ontological relativism
[Putnam, by O'Grady]
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4716
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The correspondence theory is wrong, because there is no one correspondence between reality and fact
[Putnam, by O'Grady]
|
14214
|
If we try to cure the abundance of theories with causal links, this is 'just more theory'
[Putnam, by Lewis]
|
4718
|
If necessity is always relative to a description in a language, then there is only 'de dicto' necessity
[Putnam, by O'Grady]
|
7624
|
The word 'inconsiderate' nicely shows the blurring of facts and values
[Putnam]
|
7610
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A fact is simply what it is rational to accept
[Putnam]
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7611
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Rationality is one part of our conception of human flourishing
[Putnam]
|
7612
|
Reference is social not individual, because we defer to experts when referring to elm trees
[Putnam]
|
7613
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Concepts are (at least in part) abilities and not occurrences
[Putnam]
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14202
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Neither individual nor community mental states fix reference
[Putnam]
|
14201
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Maybe the total mental state of a language community fixes the reference of a term
[Putnam]
|
14206
|
There are infinitely many interpretations of a sentence which can all seem to be 'correct'
[Putnam]
|
14200
|
'Water' on Twin Earth doesn't refer to water, but no mental difference can account for this
[Putnam]
|
14204
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Naïve operationalism would have meanings change every time the tests change
[Putnam]
|
14205
|
The sentence 'A cat is on a mat' remains always true when 'cat' means cherry and 'mat' means tree
[Putnam]
|
14203
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Intension is not meaning, as 'cube' and 'square-faced polyhedron' are intensionally the same
[Putnam]
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14207
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If cats equal cherries, model theory allows reinterpretation of the whole language preserving truth
[Putnam]
|
7616
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Truth is an idealisation of rational acceptability
[Putnam]
|
7617
|
Before Kant, all philosophers had a correspondence theory of truth
[Putnam]
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7618
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Very nominalistic philosophers deny properties, though scientists accept them
[Putnam]
|
7620
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Some kind of objective 'rightness' is a presupposition of thought itself
[Putnam]
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7623
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For ancient Greeks being wise was an ethical value
[Putnam]
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