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Full Idea
Whatever happens in special cases, causal theories usually make it easy to be wrong about the thing we refer to.
Gist of Idea
Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy
Source
David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'What Is')
Book Ref
Lewis,David: 'Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology' [CUP 1999], p.77
A Reaction
I suppose the point of this is that there are no checks and balances to keep reference in focus, but just a requirement to keep connected to an increasingly attenuated causal chain.
| 14209 | Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis] |
| 14215 | Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis] |
| 14210 | A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis] |
| 14213 | Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis] |
| 14212 | A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis] |