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Full Idea
Boolos's conception of plural logic is as a reinterpretation of second-order logic.
Gist of Idea
Boolos reinterprets second-order logic as plural logic
Source
report of George Boolos (On Second-Order Logic [1975]) by Oliver,A/Smiley,T - What are Sets and What are they For? n5
Book Ref
'Metaphysics (Philosophical Perspectives 20)', ed/tr. Hawthorne,John [Blackwell 2006], p.152
A Reaction
Oliver and Smiley don't accept this view, and champion plural reference differently (as, I think, some kind of metalinguistic device?).
| 14249 | Boolos reinterprets second-order logic as plural logic [Boolos, by Oliver/Smiley] |
| 13841 | Why should compactness be definitive of logic? [Boolos, by Hacking] |
| 10829 | A sentence can't be a truth of logic if it asserts the existence of certain sets [Boolos] |
| 10830 | Second-order logic metatheory is set-theoretic, and second-order validity has set-theoretic problems [Boolos] |
| 10832 | '∀x x=x' only means 'everything is identical to itself' if the range of 'everything' is fixed [Boolos] |
| 10833 | Many concepts can only be expressed by second-order logic [Boolos] |
| 10834 | Weak completeness: if it is valid, it is provable. Strong: it is provable from a set of sentences [Boolos] |