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Full Idea
It seems wrong to identify the 'being' of an object, its being what it is, with its existence. In one respect existence is too weak; for there is more to an object than mere existence; also too strong, for an object's nature need not include existence.
Gist of Idea
An object's 'being' isn't existence; there's more to an object than existence, and its nature doesn't include existence
Source
Kit Fine (Ontological Dependence [1995], I)
Book Ref
-: 'Aristotelian Society' [], p.274
A Reaction
The word 'being' has been shockingly woolly, from Parmenides to Heidegger, but if you identify it with a thing's 'nature' that strikes me as much clearer (even if a little misty).
14161 | Many things have being (as topics of propositions), but may not have actual existence [Russell] |
16966 | Philosophers tend to distinguish broad 'being' from narrower 'existence' - but I reject that [Quine] |
12323 | Existence is Being itself, but only as our thought decides it [Badiou] |
14253 | An object's 'being' isn't existence; there's more to an object than existence, and its nature doesn't include existence [Fine,K] |