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Full Idea
It seems wrong to identify the 'being' of an object, its being what it is, with its existence. In one respect existence is too weak; for there is more to an object than mere existence; also too strong, for an object's nature need not include existence.
Gist of Idea
An object's 'being' isn't existence; there's more to an object than existence, and its nature doesn't include existence
Source
Kit Fine (Ontological Dependence [1995], I)
Book Ref
-: 'Aristotelian Society' [], p.274
A Reaction
The word 'being' has been shockingly woolly, from Parmenides to Heidegger, but if you identify it with a thing's 'nature' that strikes me as much clearer (even if a little misty).
| 14250 | Metaphysics deals with the existence of things and with the nature of things [Fine,K] |
| 14253 | An object's 'being' isn't existence; there's more to an object than existence, and its nature doesn't include existence [Fine,K] |
| 14251 | A natural modal account of dependence says x depends on y if y must exist when x does [Fine,K] |
| 14252 | We should understand identity in terms of the propositions it renders true [Fine,K] |
| 14256 | How do we distinguish basic from derived esssences? [Fine,K] |
| 14257 | An object depends on another if the second cannot be eliminated from the first's definition [Fine,K] |
| 14255 | We understand things through their dependency relations [Fine,K] |
| 14254 | Dependency is the real counterpart of one term defining another [Fine,K] |
| 14259 | Maybe two objects might require simultaneous real definitions, as with two simultaneous terms [Fine,K] |
| 14261 | There is 'weak' dependence in one definition, and 'strong' dependence in all the definitions [Fine,K] |
| 14258 | Maybe some things have essential relationships as well as essential properties [Fine,K] |
| 14260 | An object only essentially has a property if that property follows from every definition of the object [Fine,K] |