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Full Idea
The notion of one object depending upon another is the real counterpart to the nominal notion of one term being definable in terms of another.
Gist of Idea
Dependency is the real counterpart of one term defining another
Source
Kit Fine (Ontological Dependence [1995], II)
Book Ref
-: 'Aristotelian Society' [], p.275
A Reaction
This begins to fill out the Aristotelian picture very nicely, since definitions are right at the centre of the nature of things (though a much more transitional part of the story than Fine seems to think).
| 14250 | Metaphysics deals with the existence of things and with the nature of things [Fine,K] |
| 14253 | An object's 'being' isn't existence; there's more to an object than existence, and its nature doesn't include existence [Fine,K] |
| 14251 | A natural modal account of dependence says x depends on y if y must exist when x does [Fine,K] |
| 14252 | We should understand identity in terms of the propositions it renders true [Fine,K] |
| 14256 | How do we distinguish basic from derived esssences? [Fine,K] |
| 14257 | An object depends on another if the second cannot be eliminated from the first's definition [Fine,K] |
| 14255 | We understand things through their dependency relations [Fine,K] |
| 14254 | Dependency is the real counterpart of one term defining another [Fine,K] |
| 14259 | Maybe two objects might require simultaneous real definitions, as with two simultaneous terms [Fine,K] |
| 14261 | There is 'weak' dependence in one definition, and 'strong' dependence in all the definitions [Fine,K] |
| 14258 | Maybe some things have essential relationships as well as essential properties [Fine,K] |
| 14260 | An object only essentially has a property if that property follows from every definition of the object [Fine,K] |