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Single Idea 14256

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence ]

Full Idea

How and where are we to draw the line between what is basic to the essence and what is derived?

Gist of Idea

How do we distinguish basic from derived esssences?

Source

Kit Fine (Ontological Dependence [1995], II)

Book Ref

-: 'Aristotelian Society' [], p.277


A Reaction

He calls the basic essence 'constitutive' and the rest the 'consequential' essence. This question is obviously very challenging for the essentialist. See Idea 22.

Related Idea

Idea 22 Trained minds never expect more precision than is possible [Aristotle]


The 17 ideas with the same theme [distinctions about how essence should be understood]:

Only universals have essence [Plato, by Politis]
Aristotelian essences are causal, not classificatory [Aristotle, by Witt]
An essence can either be universal (in the mind) or singular (in concrete particulars) [Avicenna, by Panaccio]
Specific individual essence is defined by material, and generic essence is defined by form [Aquinas]
Avicenna and Duns Scotus say essences have independent and prior existence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
Locke may distinguish real essence from internal constitution, claiming the latter is knowable [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
'Individual essences' fix a particular individual, and 'kind essences' fix the kind it belongs to [Ellis]
For Kripke, essence is origin; for Putnam, essence is properties; for Wiggins, essence is membership of a kind [Kripke, by Mautner]
Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga]
Aristotelian and Kripkean essentialism are very different theories [Witt]
Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties [Fine,K]
How do we distinguish basic from derived esssences? [Fine,K]
Maybe some things have essential relationships as well as essential properties [Fine,K]
Causal reference presupposes essentialism if it refers to modally extended entities [Sidelle]
Essentialism: real or representational? sortal, causal or ideal? real particulars, or placeholders? [Gelman]
Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki]