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Single Idea 14289

[filed under theme 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals ]

Full Idea

Jackson came to realise that there are assertable conditionals which one would not continue to believe if one learned the antecedent, such as Lewis's "If Reagan worked for the KGB, I'll never find out".

Gist of Idea

There are some assertable conditionals one would reject if one learned the antecedent

Source

report of Frank Jackson (Conditionals [1987]) by Dorothy Edgington - Conditionals (Stanf) 4.2

Book Ref

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.23


A Reaction

That pesky David Lewis made trouble for everybody. Edgington agrees that his earlier formulation (Idea 14288) holds good for nearly all cases. There is a self-referential element in Lewis's example.

Related Idea

Idea 14288 'If A,B' affirms that A⊃B, and also that this wouldn't change if A were certain [Jackson, by Edgington]


The 25 ideas with the same theme [conditional truth based entirely on components]:

Conditionals are false if the falsehood of the conclusion does not conflict with the antecedent [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
Inferring q from p only needs p to be true, and 'not-p or q' to be true [Russell]
All forms of implication are expressible as truth-functions [Russell]
In the truth-functional account a burnt-up match was soluble because it never entered water [Carnap]
The odd truth table for material conditionals is explained by conversational conventions [Grice, by Fisher]
Conditionals might remain truth-functional, despite inappropriate conversational remarks [Edgington on Grice]
Conditionals are truth-functional, but we must take care with misleading ones [Grice, by Edgington]
Normal conditionals have a truth-value gap when the antecedent is false. [Quine]
'If A,B' affirms that A⊃B, and also that this wouldn't change if A were certain [Jackson, by Edgington]
Conditionals are truth-functional, but should only be asserted when they are confident [Jackson, by Edgington]
There are some assertable conditionals one would reject if one learned the antecedent [Jackson, by Edgington]
Modus ponens requires that A→B is F when A is T and B is F [Jackson]
When A and B have the same truth value, A→B is true, because A→A is a logical truth [Jackson]
(A&B)→A is a logical truth, even if antecedent false and consequent true, so it is T if A is F and B is T [Jackson]
The truth-functional account of conditionals is right, if the antecedent is really acceptable [Jackson, by Edgington]
Lewis says indicative conditionals are truth-functional [Lewis, by Jackson]
Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington]
'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington]
Inferring conditionals from disjunctions or negated conjunctions gives support to truth-functionalism [Edgington]
The truth-functional view makes conditionals with unlikely antecedents likely to be true [Edgington]
Truth-function problems don't show up in mathematics [Edgington]
Doctor:'If patient still alive, change dressing'; Nurse:'Either dead patient, or change dressing'; kills patient! [Edgington]
Truth-functional conditionals can't distinguish whether they are causal or accidental [Mumford]
A material conditional cannot capture counterfactual reasoning [Potter]
If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q [Fisher]