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Single Idea 14296

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived ]

Full Idea

Each disposition, in my view, is a physical state or mechanism. ...In some cases nowadays we understand the physical details and set them forth explicitly in terms of the arrangement and interaction of small bodies. This replaces the old disposition.

Gist of Idea

Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term

Source

Willard Quine (The Roots of Reference [1990], p.11), quoted by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions 01.3

Book Ref

Mumford,Stephen: 'Dispositions' [OUP 1998], p.13


A Reaction

A challenge to the dispositions and powers view of nature, one which rests on the 'categorical' structural properties, rather than the 'hypothetical' dispositions. But can we define a mechanism without mentioning its powers?


The 23 ideas with the same theme [powers as products of something more basic]:

A power is not a cause, but an aptitude for a cause [Zabarella]
All powers can be explained by obvious features like size, shape and motion of matter [Descartes]
The complete power of an event is just the aggregate of the qualities that produced it [Hobbes]
The essence of whiteness in a man is nothing but the power to produce the idea of whiteness [Locke]
It is obvious that there could not be a power without a subject which possesses it [Reid]
Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine]
Basic powers may not be explained by structure, if at the bottom level there is no structure [Ellis]
Maybe dispositions can be explained by intrinsic properties or structures [Ellis]
I now deny that properties are cluster of powers, and take causal properties as basic [Shoemaker]
Things have powers in virtue of (which are entailed by) their properties [Shoemaker]
One power can come from different properties; a thing's powers come from its properties [Shoemaker]
Properties are functions producing powers, and powers are functions producing effects [Shoemaker]
Powers are not qualities; they just point to directions of empirical investigation [Harré/Madden]
A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis]
All dispositions must have causal bases [Lewis]
Lewisian properties have powers because of their relationships to other properties [Lewis, by Hawthorne]
Powers or dispositions are usually seen as caused by lower-level qualities [Heil]
Dispositions are classifications of properties by functional role [Mumford]
If dispositions have several categorical realisations, that makes the two separate [Mumford]
I say the categorical base causes the disposition manifestation [Mumford]
If all properties are potencies, and stimuli and manifestation characterise them, there is a regress [Bird]
The essence of a potency involves relations, e.g. mass, to impressed force and acceleration [Bird]
Powers are not just basic forces, since they combine to make new powers [Mumford/Anjum]