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Single Idea 14303
[filed under theme 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
]
Full Idea
The utility of [truth-functional conditionals] is that it puts us in possession of a rule...[namely] The hypothetical proposition may be ...falsified by a single state of things, but only by one in which A [antecedent] is true and B [consequent] is false.
Gist of Idea
Truth-functional conditionals have a simple falsification, when A is true and B is false
Source
Charles Sanders Peirce (On the Algebra of Logic [1895], p.218), quoted by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions
Book Ref
Mumford,Stephen: 'Dispositions' [OUP 1998], p.45
A Reaction
Personally I am rather more interested in verifying conditionals than in falsifying them. I certainly don't accept them until they are falsified, unless they have massive support from surrounding facts.
The
15 ideas
with the same theme
[conditional truth adding to the components]:
14304
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Conditionals are true when the antecedent is true, and the consequent has to be true
[Diod.Cronus]
|
14303
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Truth-functional conditionals have a simple falsification, when A is true and B is false
[Peirce]
|
10993
|
Ramsey's Test: believe the consequent if you believe the antecedent
[Ramsey, by Read]
|
13766
|
'If' is the same as 'given that', so the degrees of belief should conform to probability theory
[Ramsey, by Ramsey]
|
14358
|
In the possible worlds account of conditionals, modus ponens and modus tollens are validated
[Jackson]
|
14359
|
Only assertions have truth-values, and conditionals are not proper assertions
[Jackson]
|
14357
|
Possible worlds account, unlike A⊃B, says nothing about when A is false
[Jackson]
|
10994
|
Conditionals are true if minimal revision of the antecedent verifies the consequent
[Stalnaker, by Read]
|
14271
|
Non-truth-functionalist say 'If A,B' is false if A is T and B is F, but deny that is always true for TT,FT and FF
[Edgington]
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14272
|
I say "If you touch that wire you'll get a shock"; you don't touch it. How can that make the conditional true?
[Edgington]
|
13855
|
A conditional does not have truth conditions
[Edgington]
|
13859
|
X believes 'if A, B' to the extent that A & B is more likely than A & ¬B
[Edgington]
|
14311
|
Dispositions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals
[Mumford]
|
14185
|
Conditionals are just a shorthand for some proof, leaving out the details
[Read]
|
8949
|
In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent
[Fisher]
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