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Single Idea 14303

[filed under theme 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals ]

Full Idea

The utility of [truth-functional conditionals] is that it puts us in possession of a rule...[namely] The hypothetical proposition may be ...falsified by a single state of things, but only by one in which A [antecedent] is true and B [consequent] is false.

Gist of Idea

Truth-functional conditionals have a simple falsification, when A is true and B is false

Source

Charles Sanders Peirce (On the Algebra of Logic [1895], p.218), quoted by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions

Book Ref

Mumford,Stephen: 'Dispositions' [OUP 1998], p.45


A Reaction

Personally I am rather more interested in verifying conditionals than in falsifying them. I certainly don't accept them until they are falsified, unless they have massive support from surrounding facts.


The 15 ideas with the same theme [conditional truth adding to the components]:

Conditionals are true when the antecedent is true, and the consequent has to be true [Diod.Cronus]
Truth-functional conditionals have a simple falsification, when A is true and B is false [Peirce]
Ramsey's Test: believe the consequent if you believe the antecedent [Ramsey, by Read]
'If' is the same as 'given that', so the degrees of belief should conform to probability theory [Ramsey, by Ramsey]
In the possible worlds account of conditionals, modus ponens and modus tollens are validated [Jackson]
Only assertions have truth-values, and conditionals are not proper assertions [Jackson]
Possible worlds account, unlike A⊃B, says nothing about when A is false [Jackson]
Conditionals are true if minimal revision of the antecedent verifies the consequent [Stalnaker, by Read]
Non-truth-functionalist say 'If A,B' is false if A is T and B is F, but deny that is always true for TT,FT and FF [Edgington]
I say "If you touch that wire you'll get a shock"; you don't touch it. How can that make the conditional true? [Edgington]
A conditional does not have truth conditions [Edgington]
X believes 'if A, B' to the extent that A & B is more likely than A & ¬B [Edgington]
Dispositions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals [Mumford]
Conditionals are just a shorthand for some proof, leaving out the details [Read]
In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher]