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Full Idea
The conclusion that disposition ascriptions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals is largely to be accepted.
Gist of Idea
Dispositions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals
Source
Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 04.7)
Book Ref
Mumford,Stephen: 'Dispositions' [OUP 1998], p.81
A Reaction
[he attributes the view to C.B.Martin 1994] It is hard to see how to describe a disposition in anything other than conditional terms. Mumford's 'functional role' probably has to be described conditionally. It is how the conditional cashes out.
Related Idea
Idea 14309 Truth-functional conditionals can't distinguish whether they are causal or accidental [Mumford]
| 14304 | Conditionals are true when the antecedent is true, and the consequent has to be true [Diod.Cronus] |
| 14303 | Truth-functional conditionals have a simple falsification, when A is true and B is false [Peirce] |
| 10993 | Ramsey's Test: believe the consequent if you believe the antecedent [Ramsey, by Read] |
| 13766 | 'If' is the same as 'given that', so the degrees of belief should conform to probability theory [Ramsey, by Ramsey] |
| 14358 | In the possible worlds account of conditionals, modus ponens and modus tollens are validated [Jackson] |
| 14359 | Only assertions have truth-values, and conditionals are not proper assertions [Jackson] |
| 14357 | Possible worlds account, unlike A⊃B, says nothing about when A is false [Jackson] |
| 10994 | Conditionals are true if minimal revision of the antecedent verifies the consequent [Stalnaker, by Read] |
| 14271 | Non-truth-functionalist say 'If A,B' is false if A is T and B is F, but deny that is always true for TT,FT and FF [Edgington] |
| 14272 | I say "If you touch that wire you'll get a shock"; you don't touch it. How can that make the conditional true? [Edgington] |
| 13855 | A conditional does not have truth conditions [Edgington] |
| 13859 | X believes 'if A, B' to the extent that A & B is more likely than A & ¬B [Edgington] |
| 14311 | Dispositions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals [Mumford] |
| 14185 | Conditionals are just a shorthand for some proof, leaving out the details [Read] |
| 8949 | In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher] |