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Single Idea 14311

[filed under theme 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals ]

Full Idea

The conclusion that disposition ascriptions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals is largely to be accepted.

Gist of Idea

Dispositions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals

Source

Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 04.7)

Book Ref

Mumford,Stephen: 'Dispositions' [OUP 1998], p.81

A Reaction

[he attributes the view to C.B.Martin 1994] It is hard to see how to describe a disposition in anything other than conditional terms. Mumford's 'functional role' probably has to be described conditionally. It is how the conditional cashes out.

Related Idea

Idea 14309 Truth-functional conditionals can't distinguish whether they are causal or accidental [Mumford]

The 41 ideas from 'Dispositions'

14291 Dispositions are not just possibilities - they are features of actual things [Mumford]
14294 Dispositions are attacked as mere regularities of events, or place-holders for unknown properties [Mumford]
14293 Dispositions are ascribed to at least objects, substances and persons [Mumford]
14295 Many artefacts have dispositional essences, which make them what they are [Mumford]
14299 There could be dispositions that are never manifested [Mumford]
14298 Dispositions can be contrasted either with occurrences, or with categorical properties [Mumford]
14302 A lead molecule is not leaden, and macroscopic properties need not be microscopically present [Mumford]
14306 Anti-realists deny truth-values to all statements, and say evidence and ontology are inseparable [Mumford]
14307 Some dispositions are so far unknown, until we learn how to manifest them [Mumford]
14309 Truth-functional conditionals can't distinguish whether they are causal or accidental [Mumford]
14310 Dispositions are classifications of properties by functional role [Mumford]
14313 All properties must be causal powers (since they wouldn't exist otherwise) [Mumford]
14311 Dispositions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals [Mumford]
14312 Orthodoxy says dispositions entail conditionals (rather than being equivalent to them) [Mumford]
14314 If dispositions are powers, background conditions makes it hard to say what they do [Mumford]
14315 Categorical properties and dispositions appear to explain one another [Mumford]
14316 If dispositions have several categorical realisations, that makes the two separate [Mumford]
14317 I say the categorical base causes the disposition manifestation [Mumford]
14318 Intrinsic properties are just causal powers, and identifying a property as causal is then analytic [Mumford]
14320 Subatomic particles may terminate explanation, if they lack structure [Mumford]
14319 Nomothetic explanations cite laws, and structural explanations cite mechanisms [Mumford]
14322 If fragile just means 'breaks when dropped', it won't explain a breakage [Mumford]
14323 If every event has a cause, it is easy to invent a power to explain each case [Mumford]
14324 Ontology is unrelated to explanation, which concerns modes of presentation and states of knowledge [Mumford]
14325 Maybe dispositions can replace powers in metaphysics, as what induces property change [Mumford]
14328 Traditional powers initiate change, but are mysterious between those changes [Mumford]
14326 Unlike categorical bases, dispositions necessarily occupy a particular causal role [Mumford]
14331 Categorical eliminativists say there are no dispositions, just categorical states or mechanisms [Mumford]
14332 There are four reasons for seeing categorical properties as the most fundamental [Mumford]
14333 Dispositions and categorical properties are two modes of presentation of the same thing [Mumford]
14334 Modest realism says there is a reality; the presumptuous view says we can accurately describe it [Mumford]
14336 Categorical predicates are those unconnected to functions [Mumford]
14337 Maybe dispositions can replace the 'laws of nature' as the basis of explanation [Mumford]
14338 In the 'laws' view events are basic, and properties are categorical, only existing when manifested [Mumford]
14339 Without laws, how can a dispositionalist explain general behaviour within kinds? [Mumford]
14341 Dretske and Armstrong base laws on regularities between individual properties, not between events [Mumford]
14340 It is a regularity that whenever a person sneezes, someone (somewhere) promptly coughs [Mumford]
14343 To avoid a regress in explanations, ungrounded dispositions will always have to be posited [Mumford]
14342 General laws depend upon the capacities of particulars, not the other way around [Mumford]
14344 Natural kinds, such as electrons, all behave the same way because we divide them by dispositions [Mumford]
14345 The necessity of an electron being an electron is conceptual, and won't ground necessary laws [Mumford]