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Single Idea 14311
[filed under theme 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
]
Full Idea
The conclusion that disposition ascriptions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals is largely to be accepted.
Gist of Idea
Dispositions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals
Source
Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 04.7)
Book Ref
Mumford,Stephen: 'Dispositions' [OUP 1998], p.81
A Reaction
[he attributes the view to C.B.Martin 1994] It is hard to see how to describe a disposition in anything other than conditional terms. Mumford's 'functional role' probably has to be described conditionally. It is how the conditional cashes out.
Related Idea
Idea 14309
Truth-functional conditionals can't distinguish whether they are causal or accidental [Mumford]
The
41 ideas
from 'Dispositions'
14291
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Dispositions are not just possibilities - they are features of actual things
[Mumford]
|
14294
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Dispositions are attacked as mere regularities of events, or place-holders for unknown properties
[Mumford]
|
14293
|
Dispositions are ascribed to at least objects, substances and persons
[Mumford]
|
14295
|
Many artefacts have dispositional essences, which make them what they are
[Mumford]
|
14299
|
There could be dispositions that are never manifested
[Mumford]
|
14298
|
Dispositions can be contrasted either with occurrences, or with categorical properties
[Mumford]
|
14302
|
A lead molecule is not leaden, and macroscopic properties need not be microscopically present
[Mumford]
|
14306
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Anti-realists deny truth-values to all statements, and say evidence and ontology are inseparable
[Mumford]
|
14307
|
Some dispositions are so far unknown, until we learn how to manifest them
[Mumford]
|
14309
|
Truth-functional conditionals can't distinguish whether they are causal or accidental
[Mumford]
|
14310
|
Dispositions are classifications of properties by functional role
[Mumford]
|
14312
|
Orthodoxy says dispositions entail conditionals (rather than being equivalent to them)
[Mumford]
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14313
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All properties must be causal powers (since they wouldn't exist otherwise)
[Mumford]
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14311
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Dispositions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals
[Mumford]
|
14314
|
If dispositions are powers, background conditions makes it hard to say what they do
[Mumford]
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14315
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Categorical properties and dispositions appear to explain one another
[Mumford]
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14316
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If dispositions have several categorical realisations, that makes the two separate
[Mumford]
|
14317
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I say the categorical base causes the disposition manifestation
[Mumford]
|
14318
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Intrinsic properties are just causal powers, and identifying a property as causal is then analytic
[Mumford]
|
14319
|
Nomothetic explanations cite laws, and structural explanations cite mechanisms
[Mumford]
|
14320
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Subatomic particles may terminate explanation, if they lack structure
[Mumford]
|
14322
|
If fragile just means 'breaks when dropped', it won't explain a breakage
[Mumford]
|
14323
|
If every event has a cause, it is easy to invent a power to explain each case
[Mumford]
|
14324
|
Ontology is unrelated to explanation, which concerns modes of presentation and states of knowledge
[Mumford]
|
14325
|
Maybe dispositions can replace powers in metaphysics, as what induces property change
[Mumford]
|
14328
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Traditional powers initiate change, but are mysterious between those changes
[Mumford]
|
14326
|
Unlike categorical bases, dispositions necessarily occupy a particular causal role
[Mumford]
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14331
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Categorical eliminativists say there are no dispositions, just categorical states or mechanisms
[Mumford]
|
14332
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There are four reasons for seeing categorical properties as the most fundamental
[Mumford]
|
14333
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Dispositions and categorical properties are two modes of presentation of the same thing
[Mumford]
|
14334
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Modest realism says there is a reality; the presumptuous view says we can accurately describe it
[Mumford]
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14336
|
Categorical predicates are those unconnected to functions
[Mumford]
|
14337
|
Maybe dispositions can replace the 'laws of nature' as the basis of explanation
[Mumford]
|
14338
|
In the 'laws' view events are basic, and properties are categorical, only existing when manifested
[Mumford]
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14339
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Without laws, how can a dispositionalist explain general behaviour within kinds?
[Mumford]
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14340
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It is a regularity that whenever a person sneezes, someone (somewhere) promptly coughs
[Mumford]
|
14341
|
Dretske and Armstrong base laws on regularities between individual properties, not between events
[Mumford]
|
14343
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To avoid a regress in explanations, ungrounded dispositions will always have to be posited
[Mumford]
|
14342
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General laws depend upon the capacities of particulars, not the other way around
[Mumford]
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14344
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Natural kinds, such as electrons, all behave the same way because we divide them by dispositions
[Mumford]
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14345
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The necessity of an electron being an electron is conceptual, and won't ground necessary laws
[Mumford]
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