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Single Idea 14311
[filed under theme 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
]
Full Idea
The conclusion that disposition ascriptions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals is largely to be accepted.
Gist of Idea
Dispositions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals
Source
Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 04.7)
Book Ref
Mumford,Stephen: 'Dispositions' [OUP 1998], p.81
A Reaction
[he attributes the view to C.B.Martin 1994] It is hard to see how to describe a disposition in anything other than conditional terms. Mumford's 'functional role' probably has to be described conditionally. It is how the conditional cashes out.
Related Idea
Idea 14309
Truth-functional conditionals can't distinguish whether they are causal or accidental [Mumford]
The
70 ideas
from Stephen Mumford
19068
|
Causation interests us because we want to explain change
[Mumford]
|
14291
|
Dispositions are not just possibilities - they are features of actual things
[Mumford]
|
14293
|
Dispositions are ascribed to at least objects, substances and persons
[Mumford]
|
14294
|
Dispositions are attacked as mere regularities of events, or place-holders for unknown properties
[Mumford]
|
14295
|
Many artefacts have dispositional essences, which make them what they are
[Mumford]
|
14299
|
There could be dispositions that are never manifested
[Mumford]
|
14298
|
Dispositions can be contrasted either with occurrences, or with categorical properties
[Mumford]
|
14302
|
A lead molecule is not leaden, and macroscopic properties need not be microscopically present
[Mumford]
|
14306
|
Anti-realists deny truth-values to all statements, and say evidence and ontology are inseparable
[Mumford]
|
14307
|
Some dispositions are so far unknown, until we learn how to manifest them
[Mumford]
|
14309
|
Truth-functional conditionals can't distinguish whether they are causal or accidental
[Mumford]
|
14310
|
Dispositions are classifications of properties by functional role
[Mumford]
|
14312
|
Orthodoxy says dispositions entail conditionals (rather than being equivalent to them)
[Mumford]
|
14313
|
All properties must be causal powers (since they wouldn't exist otherwise)
[Mumford]
|
14311
|
Dispositions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals
[Mumford]
|
14314
|
If dispositions are powers, background conditions makes it hard to say what they do
[Mumford]
|
14315
|
Categorical properties and dispositions appear to explain one another
[Mumford]
|
14316
|
If dispositions have several categorical realisations, that makes the two separate
[Mumford]
|
14317
|
I say the categorical base causes the disposition manifestation
[Mumford]
|
14318
|
Intrinsic properties are just causal powers, and identifying a property as causal is then analytic
[Mumford]
|
14319
|
Nomothetic explanations cite laws, and structural explanations cite mechanisms
[Mumford]
|
14320
|
Subatomic particles may terminate explanation, if they lack structure
[Mumford]
|
14322
|
If fragile just means 'breaks when dropped', it won't explain a breakage
[Mumford]
|
14323
|
If every event has a cause, it is easy to invent a power to explain each case
[Mumford]
|
14324
|
Ontology is unrelated to explanation, which concerns modes of presentation and states of knowledge
[Mumford]
|
14325
|
Maybe dispositions can replace powers in metaphysics, as what induces property change
[Mumford]
|
14328
|
Traditional powers initiate change, but are mysterious between those changes
[Mumford]
|
14326
|
Unlike categorical bases, dispositions necessarily occupy a particular causal role
[Mumford]
|
14331
|
Categorical eliminativists say there are no dispositions, just categorical states or mechanisms
[Mumford]
|
14332
|
There are four reasons for seeing categorical properties as the most fundamental
[Mumford]
|
14333
|
Dispositions and categorical properties are two modes of presentation of the same thing
[Mumford]
|
14334
|
Modest realism says there is a reality; the presumptuous view says we can accurately describe it
[Mumford]
|
14336
|
Categorical predicates are those unconnected to functions
[Mumford]
|
14337
|
Maybe dispositions can replace the 'laws of nature' as the basis of explanation
[Mumford]
|
14338
|
In the 'laws' view events are basic, and properties are categorical, only existing when manifested
[Mumford]
|
14339
|
Without laws, how can a dispositionalist explain general behaviour within kinds?
[Mumford]
|
14340
|
It is a regularity that whenever a person sneezes, someone (somewhere) promptly coughs
[Mumford]
|
14341
|
Dretske and Armstrong base laws on regularities between individual properties, not between events
[Mumford]
|
14342
|
General laws depend upon the capacities of particulars, not the other way around
[Mumford]
|
14343
|
To avoid a regress in explanations, ungrounded dispositions will always have to be posited
[Mumford]
|
14344
|
Natural kinds, such as electrons, all behave the same way because we divide them by dispositions
[Mumford]
|
14345
|
The necessity of an electron being an electron is conceptual, and won't ground necessary laws
[Mumford]
|
9408
|
Science studies phenomena, but only metaphysics tells us what exists
[Mumford]
|
9412
|
You only need laws if you (erroneously) think the world is otherwise inert
[Mumford]
|
9411
|
There are no laws of nature in Aristotle; they became standard with Descartes and Newton
[Mumford]
|
9415
|
Would it count as a regularity if the only five As were also B?
[Mumford]
|
9416
|
Regularities are more likely with few instances, and guaranteed with no instances!
[Mumford]
|
9422
|
If the best system describes a nomological system, the laws are in nature, not in the description
[Mumford]
|
9421
|
The best systems theory says regularities derive from laws, rather than constituting them
[Mumford]
|
9427
|
For Humeans the world is a world primarily of events
[Mumford]
|
9429
|
Many forms of reasoning, such as extrapolation and analogy, are useful but deductively invalid
[Mumford]
|
9430
|
Singular causes, and identities, might be necessary without falling under a law
[Mumford]
|
9431
|
Pure regularities are rare, usually only found in idealized conditions
[Mumford]
|
9432
|
Laws of nature are necessary relations between universal properties, rather than about particulars
[Mumford]
|
9433
|
If laws can be uninstantiated, this favours the view of them as connecting universals
[Mumford]
|
9434
|
Laws of nature are just the possession of essential properties by natural kinds
[Mumford]
|
9435
|
A 'porridge' nominalist thinks we just divide reality in any way that suits us
[Mumford]
|
12248
|
How can we show that a universally possessed property is an essential property?
[Mumford]
|
9437
|
To distinguish accidental from essential properties, we must include possible members of kinds
[Mumford]
|
9439
|
The Central Dilemma is how to explain an internal or external view of laws which govern
[Mumford]
|
9441
|
Regularity laws don't explain, because they have no governing role
[Mumford]
|
9443
|
It is only properties which are the source of necessity in the world
[Mumford]
|
9444
|
There are four candidates for the logical form of law statements
[Mumford]
|
9445
|
We can give up the counterfactual account if we take causal language at face value
[Mumford]
|
9447
|
If properties are clusters of powers, this can explain why properties resemble in degrees
[Mumford]
|
9446
|
Properties are just natural clusters of powers
[Mumford]
|
18617
|
Substances, unlike aggregates, can survive a change of parts
[Mumford]
|
18618
|
Maybe possibilities are recombinations of the existing elements of reality
[Mumford]
|
18619
|
Combinatorial possibility has to allow all elements to be combinable, which seems unlikely
[Mumford]
|
18620
|
Combinatorial possibility relies on what actually exists (even over time), but there could be more
[Mumford]
|