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Full Idea
The realist says that disposition ascriptions are ascriptions of real powers. This leaves unanswered the question, 'power to do what?' The problem of background conditions means that the realist cannot say what it is that a power is a power to do.
Gist of Idea
If dispositions are powers, background conditions makes it hard to say what they do
Source
Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 04.9)
Book Ref
Mumford,Stephen: 'Dispositions' [OUP 1998], p.88
A Reaction
It is hard to say what a disposition will do, under any other account of dispositions. I would take a power to be defined by a 'modal profile', rather than an actual account of what it will lead to.
| 12941 | There cannot be power without action; the power is a disposition to act [Leibniz] |
| 12312 | The real essence of a thing is its powers, or 'dispositional properties' [Copi] |
| 12686 | Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties [Ellis] |
| 13596 | A causal power is a disposition to produce forces [Ellis] |
| 13599 | Powers are dispositions of the essences of kinds that involve them in causation [Ellis] |
| 8548 | Dispositional predicates ascribe powers, and the rest ascribe properties [Shoemaker] |
| 11939 | If powers only exist when actual, they seem to be nomadic, and indistinguishable from non-powers [Molnar] |
| 14314 | If dispositions are powers, background conditions makes it hard to say what they do [Mumford] |
| 14325 | Maybe dispositions can replace powers in metaphysics, as what induces property change [Mumford] |
| 23774 | There are basic powers, which underlie dispositions, potentialities, capacities etc [Williams,NE] |
| 23791 | Dispositions are just useful descriptions, which are explained by underlying powers [Williams,NE] |
| 14536 | We say 'power' and 'disposition' are equivalent, but some say dispositions are manifestable [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 16738 | Scholastics reject dispositions, because they are not actual, as forms require [Pasnau] |