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Single Idea 14315

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties ]

Full Idea

Though categorical properties provide explanations for dispositions, categorical properties are also explained by dispositions; hence neither category uniquely explains the other.

Gist of Idea

Categorical properties and dispositions appear to explain one another

Source

Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 05.3)

Book Ref

Mumford,Stephen: 'Dispositions' [OUP 1998], p.101

A Reaction

The conclusion doesn't seem to follow. It depends which one is found at the bottom level. It can go up from a basic disposition, to a categorical property, to another disposition - or the other way around.

The 70 ideas from Stephen Mumford

19068 Causation interests us because we want to explain change [Mumford]
14291 Dispositions are not just possibilities - they are features of actual things [Mumford]
14294 Dispositions are attacked as mere regularities of events, or place-holders for unknown properties [Mumford]
14293 Dispositions are ascribed to at least objects, substances and persons [Mumford]
14295 Many artefacts have dispositional essences, which make them what they are [Mumford]
14299 There could be dispositions that are never manifested [Mumford]
14298 Dispositions can be contrasted either with occurrences, or with categorical properties [Mumford]
14302 A lead molecule is not leaden, and macroscopic properties need not be microscopically present [Mumford]
14306 Anti-realists deny truth-values to all statements, and say evidence and ontology are inseparable [Mumford]
14307 Some dispositions are so far unknown, until we learn how to manifest them [Mumford]
14309 Truth-functional conditionals can't distinguish whether they are causal or accidental [Mumford]
14310 Dispositions are classifications of properties by functional role [Mumford]
14311 Dispositions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals [Mumford]
14313 All properties must be causal powers (since they wouldn't exist otherwise) [Mumford]
14312 Orthodoxy says dispositions entail conditionals (rather than being equivalent to them) [Mumford]
14314 If dispositions are powers, background conditions makes it hard to say what they do [Mumford]
14315 Categorical properties and dispositions appear to explain one another [Mumford]
14316 If dispositions have several categorical realisations, that makes the two separate [Mumford]
14317 I say the categorical base causes the disposition manifestation [Mumford]
14318 Intrinsic properties are just causal powers, and identifying a property as causal is then analytic [Mumford]
14319 Nomothetic explanations cite laws, and structural explanations cite mechanisms [Mumford]
14320 Subatomic particles may terminate explanation, if they lack structure [Mumford]
14322 If fragile just means 'breaks when dropped', it won't explain a breakage [Mumford]
14323 If every event has a cause, it is easy to invent a power to explain each case [Mumford]
14324 Ontology is unrelated to explanation, which concerns modes of presentation and states of knowledge [Mumford]
14325 Maybe dispositions can replace powers in metaphysics, as what induces property change [Mumford]
14328 Traditional powers initiate change, but are mysterious between those changes [Mumford]
14326 Unlike categorical bases, dispositions necessarily occupy a particular causal role [Mumford]
14331 Categorical eliminativists say there are no dispositions, just categorical states or mechanisms [Mumford]
14332 There are four reasons for seeing categorical properties as the most fundamental [Mumford]
14333 Dispositions and categorical properties are two modes of presentation of the same thing [Mumford]
14334 Modest realism says there is a reality; the presumptuous view says we can accurately describe it [Mumford]
14336 Categorical predicates are those unconnected to functions [Mumford]
14337 Maybe dispositions can replace the 'laws of nature' as the basis of explanation [Mumford]
14338 In the 'laws' view events are basic, and properties are categorical, only existing when manifested [Mumford]
14339 Without laws, how can a dispositionalist explain general behaviour within kinds? [Mumford]
14341 Dretske and Armstrong base laws on regularities between individual properties, not between events [Mumford]
14340 It is a regularity that whenever a person sneezes, someone (somewhere) promptly coughs [Mumford]
14343 To avoid a regress in explanations, ungrounded dispositions will always have to be posited [Mumford]
14342 General laws depend upon the capacities of particulars, not the other way around [Mumford]
14344 Natural kinds, such as electrons, all behave the same way because we divide them by dispositions [Mumford]
14345 The necessity of an electron being an electron is conceptual, and won't ground necessary laws [Mumford]
9408 Science studies phenomena, but only metaphysics tells us what exists [Mumford]
9412 You only need laws if you (erroneously) think the world is otherwise inert [Mumford]
9411 There are no laws of nature in Aristotle; they became standard with Descartes and Newton [Mumford]
9415 Would it count as a regularity if the only five As were also B? [Mumford]
9416 Regularities are more likely with few instances, and guaranteed with no instances! [Mumford]
9422 If the best system describes a nomological system, the laws are in nature, not in the description [Mumford]
9421 The best systems theory says regularities derive from laws, rather than constituting them [Mumford]
9427 For Humeans the world is a world primarily of events [Mumford]
9429 Many forms of reasoning, such as extrapolation and analogy, are useful but deductively invalid [Mumford]
9430 Singular causes, and identities, might be necessary without falling under a law [Mumford]
9431 Pure regularities are rare, usually only found in idealized conditions [Mumford]
9432 Laws of nature are necessary relations between universal properties, rather than about particulars [Mumford]
9433 If laws can be uninstantiated, this favours the view of them as connecting universals [Mumford]
9434 Laws of nature are just the possession of essential properties by natural kinds [Mumford]
9435 A 'porridge' nominalist thinks we just divide reality in any way that suits us [Mumford]
12248 How can we show that a universally possessed property is an essential property? [Mumford]
9437 To distinguish accidental from essential properties, we must include possible members of kinds [Mumford]
9439 The Central Dilemma is how to explain an internal or external view of laws which govern [Mumford]
9441 Regularity laws don't explain, because they have no governing role [Mumford]
9443 It is only properties which are the source of necessity in the world [Mumford]
9444 There are four candidates for the logical form of law statements [Mumford]
9445 We can give up the counterfactual account if we take causal language at face value [Mumford]
9447 If properties are clusters of powers, this can explain why properties resemble in degrees [Mumford]
9446 Properties are just natural clusters of powers [Mumford]
18617 Substances, unlike aggregates, can survive a change of parts [Mumford]
18618 Maybe possibilities are recombinations of the existing elements of reality [Mumford]
18619 Combinatorial possibility has to allow all elements to be combinable, which seems unlikely [Mumford]
18620 Combinatorial possibility relies on what actually exists (even over time), but there could be more [Mumford]