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Single Idea 14323
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
]
Full Idea
Given any event, and the assumption that every event has a cause, then some power can always be invented as the cause of that event.
Gist of Idea
If every event has a cause, it is easy to invent a power to explain each case
Source
Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 06.6)
Book Ref
Mumford,Stephen: 'Dispositions' [OUP 1998], p.137
A Reaction
This is a useful warning, and probably explains why 'powers' fell out of fashion in scientifice theorising. They seem to make a return, though, as an appropriate term for the bottom level of each of our explanations.
The
18 ideas
with the same theme
[criticisms of the idea that there are 'powers' in reality]:
15983
|
Locke explains powers, but effectively eliminates them with his talk of internal structure
[Locke, by Alexander,P]
|
13602
|
We cannot form an idea of a 'power', and the word is without meaning
[Hume]
|
11950
|
We have no idea of powers, because we have no impressions of them
[Hume]
|
11941
|
The distinction between a power and its exercise is entirely frivolous
[Hume]
|
17772
|
Kant claims causal powers are relational rather than intrinsic
[Kant, by Bayne]
|
14300
|
No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency
[Ryle]
|
11946
|
Propensities are part of a situation, not part of the objects
[Popper]
|
18397
|
Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result
[Armstrong]
|
18399
|
How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over?
[Armstrong]
|
17666
|
Actualism means that ontology cannot contain what is merely physically possible
[Armstrong]
|
17667
|
Dispositions exist, but their truth-makers are actual or categorical properties
[Armstrong]
|
17687
|
If everything is powers there is a vicious regress, as powers are defined by more powers
[Armstrong]
|
8573
|
Most properties are causally irrelevant, and we can't spot the relevant ones.
[Lewis]
|
14323
|
If every event has a cause, it is easy to invent a power to explain each case
[Mumford]
|
14328
|
Traditional powers initiate change, but are mysterious between those changes
[Mumford]
|
14331
|
Categorical eliminativists say there are no dispositions, just categorical states or mechanisms
[Mumford]
|
14582
|
Might dispositions be reduced to normativity, or to intentionality?
[Mumford/Anjum]
|
19014
|
How can spatiotemporal relations be understood in dispositional terms?
[Vetter]
|