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Single Idea 14324
[filed under theme 14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
]
Full Idea
Nothing about ontology is at stake in questions of explanation, for explanatory success is contingent upon the modes of presentation of explanans and explananda, and relative states of knowledge and ignorance.
Gist of Idea
Ontology is unrelated to explanation, which concerns modes of presentation and states of knowledge
Source
Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 06.8)
Book Ref
Mumford,Stephen: 'Dispositions' [OUP 1998], p.140
A Reaction
There are real facts about the immediate and unusual causes which immediately precede an event, and these might be candidates for a real explanation. There are also real mechanisms and powers which dictate a things behaviour.
The
70 ideas
from Stephen Mumford
19068
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Causation interests us because we want to explain change
[Mumford]
|
14291
|
Dispositions are not just possibilities - they are features of actual things
[Mumford]
|
14293
|
Dispositions are ascribed to at least objects, substances and persons
[Mumford]
|
14294
|
Dispositions are attacked as mere regularities of events, or place-holders for unknown properties
[Mumford]
|
14295
|
Many artefacts have dispositional essences, which make them what they are
[Mumford]
|
14299
|
There could be dispositions that are never manifested
[Mumford]
|
14298
|
Dispositions can be contrasted either with occurrences, or with categorical properties
[Mumford]
|
14302
|
A lead molecule is not leaden, and macroscopic properties need not be microscopically present
[Mumford]
|
14306
|
Anti-realists deny truth-values to all statements, and say evidence and ontology are inseparable
[Mumford]
|
14307
|
Some dispositions are so far unknown, until we learn how to manifest them
[Mumford]
|
14309
|
Truth-functional conditionals can't distinguish whether they are causal or accidental
[Mumford]
|
14310
|
Dispositions are classifications of properties by functional role
[Mumford]
|
14311
|
Dispositions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals
[Mumford]
|
14312
|
Orthodoxy says dispositions entail conditionals (rather than being equivalent to them)
[Mumford]
|
14313
|
All properties must be causal powers (since they wouldn't exist otherwise)
[Mumford]
|
14314
|
If dispositions are powers, background conditions makes it hard to say what they do
[Mumford]
|
14315
|
Categorical properties and dispositions appear to explain one another
[Mumford]
|
14316
|
If dispositions have several categorical realisations, that makes the two separate
[Mumford]
|
14317
|
I say the categorical base causes the disposition manifestation
[Mumford]
|
14318
|
Intrinsic properties are just causal powers, and identifying a property as causal is then analytic
[Mumford]
|
14319
|
Nomothetic explanations cite laws, and structural explanations cite mechanisms
[Mumford]
|
14320
|
Subatomic particles may terminate explanation, if they lack structure
[Mumford]
|
14322
|
If fragile just means 'breaks when dropped', it won't explain a breakage
[Mumford]
|
14323
|
If every event has a cause, it is easy to invent a power to explain each case
[Mumford]
|
14324
|
Ontology is unrelated to explanation, which concerns modes of presentation and states of knowledge
[Mumford]
|
14325
|
Maybe dispositions can replace powers in metaphysics, as what induces property change
[Mumford]
|
14328
|
Traditional powers initiate change, but are mysterious between those changes
[Mumford]
|
14326
|
Unlike categorical bases, dispositions necessarily occupy a particular causal role
[Mumford]
|
14331
|
Categorical eliminativists say there are no dispositions, just categorical states or mechanisms
[Mumford]
|
14332
|
There are four reasons for seeing categorical properties as the most fundamental
[Mumford]
|
14333
|
Dispositions and categorical properties are two modes of presentation of the same thing
[Mumford]
|
14334
|
Modest realism says there is a reality; the presumptuous view says we can accurately describe it
[Mumford]
|
14336
|
Categorical predicates are those unconnected to functions
[Mumford]
|
14337
|
Maybe dispositions can replace the 'laws of nature' as the basis of explanation
[Mumford]
|
14338
|
In the 'laws' view events are basic, and properties are categorical, only existing when manifested
[Mumford]
|
14339
|
Without laws, how can a dispositionalist explain general behaviour within kinds?
[Mumford]
|
14340
|
It is a regularity that whenever a person sneezes, someone (somewhere) promptly coughs
[Mumford]
|
14341
|
Dretske and Armstrong base laws on regularities between individual properties, not between events
[Mumford]
|
14342
|
General laws depend upon the capacities of particulars, not the other way around
[Mumford]
|
14343
|
To avoid a regress in explanations, ungrounded dispositions will always have to be posited
[Mumford]
|
14344
|
Natural kinds, such as electrons, all behave the same way because we divide them by dispositions
[Mumford]
|
14345
|
The necessity of an electron being an electron is conceptual, and won't ground necessary laws
[Mumford]
|
9408
|
Science studies phenomena, but only metaphysics tells us what exists
[Mumford]
|
9412
|
You only need laws if you (erroneously) think the world is otherwise inert
[Mumford]
|
9411
|
There are no laws of nature in Aristotle; they became standard with Descartes and Newton
[Mumford]
|
9416
|
Regularities are more likely with few instances, and guaranteed with no instances!
[Mumford]
|
9415
|
Would it count as a regularity if the only five As were also B?
[Mumford]
|
9422
|
If the best system describes a nomological system, the laws are in nature, not in the description
[Mumford]
|
9421
|
The best systems theory says regularities derive from laws, rather than constituting them
[Mumford]
|
9427
|
For Humeans the world is a world primarily of events
[Mumford]
|
9429
|
Many forms of reasoning, such as extrapolation and analogy, are useful but deductively invalid
[Mumford]
|
9430
|
Singular causes, and identities, might be necessary without falling under a law
[Mumford]
|
9431
|
Pure regularities are rare, usually only found in idealized conditions
[Mumford]
|
9432
|
Laws of nature are necessary relations between universal properties, rather than about particulars
[Mumford]
|
9433
|
If laws can be uninstantiated, this favours the view of them as connecting universals
[Mumford]
|
9434
|
Laws of nature are just the possession of essential properties by natural kinds
[Mumford]
|
9435
|
A 'porridge' nominalist thinks we just divide reality in any way that suits us
[Mumford]
|
9437
|
To distinguish accidental from essential properties, we must include possible members of kinds
[Mumford]
|
12248
|
How can we show that a universally possessed property is an essential property?
[Mumford]
|
9439
|
The Central Dilemma is how to explain an internal or external view of laws which govern
[Mumford]
|
9441
|
Regularity laws don't explain, because they have no governing role
[Mumford]
|
9443
|
It is only properties which are the source of necessity in the world
[Mumford]
|
9444
|
There are four candidates for the logical form of law statements
[Mumford]
|
9445
|
We can give up the counterfactual account if we take causal language at face value
[Mumford]
|
9447
|
If properties are clusters of powers, this can explain why properties resemble in degrees
[Mumford]
|
9446
|
Properties are just natural clusters of powers
[Mumford]
|
18617
|
Substances, unlike aggregates, can survive a change of parts
[Mumford]
|
18618
|
Maybe possibilities are recombinations of the existing elements of reality
[Mumford]
|
18619
|
Combinatorial possibility has to allow all elements to be combinable, which seems unlikely
[Mumford]
|
18620
|
Combinatorial possibility relies on what actually exists (even over time), but there could be more
[Mumford]
|