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Single Idea 14326

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions ]

Full Idea

The idea of a disposition occupying a different causal role involves a conceptual confusion, ...but there is no conceptual or logical absurdity in a categorical base occupying a different causal role.

Gist of Idea

Unlike categorical bases, dispositions necessarily occupy a particular causal role

Source

Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 07.3)

Book Ref

Mumford,Stephen: 'Dispositions' [OUP 1998], p.149


A Reaction

This is the core of Mumford's theory of dispositions. I'm beginning to think that dispositions are merely ways we have of describing and labelling functional mechanisms, and so 'dispositions' drop out of the final story.


The 25 ideas with the same theme [idea of a disposition towards certain behaviour]:

In the 17th century, 'disposition' usually just means the spatial arrangement of parts [Boyle, by Pasnau]
Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman]
Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine]
Either dispositions rest on structures, or we keep saying 'all things being equal' [Quine]
Dispositions in action can be destroyed, be recovered, or remain unchanged [Martin,CB]
To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis [Armstrong]
Nearly all fundamental properties of physics are dispositional [Ellis]
The most fundamental properties of nature (mass, charge, spin ...) all seem to be dispositions [Ellis]
Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually [Stalnaker]
We can bring dispositions into existence, as in creating an identifier [Dennett, by Mumford]
Dispositions can be causes, so they must be part of the actual world [Molnar]
Are a property's dispositions built in, or contingently added? [Heil]
Dispositions are ascribed to at least objects, substances and persons [Mumford]
Dispositions can be contrasted either with occurrences, or with categorical properties [Mumford]
Unlike categorical bases, dispositions necessarily occupy a particular causal role [Mumford]
Dispositionality is a natural selection function, picking outcomes from the range of possibilities [Mumford/Anjum]
Instead of adding Aristotelian forms to physical stuff, one could add dispositions [Pasnau]
I have an 'iterated ability' to learn the violin - that is, the ability to acquire that ability [Vetter]
Dispositions have directed behaviour which occurs if triggered [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
'Masked' dispositions fail to react because something intervenes [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
A disposition is 'altered' when the stimulus reverses the disposition [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
A disposition is 'mimicked' if a different cause produces that effect from that stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
A 'trick' can look like a stimulus for a disposition which will happen without it [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
Some dispositions manifest themselves without a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
We could analyse dispositions as 'possibilities', with no mention of a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]