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Single Idea 14328

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers ]

Full Idea

In the old-fashioned sense, 'powers' are real potentialities that initiate changes but seem to have a mysterious existence in between those changes.

Gist of Idea

Traditional powers initiate change, but are mysterious between those changes

Source

Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 07.10)

Book Ref

Mumford,Stephen: 'Dispositions' [OUP 1998], p.168

A Reaction

What is a person when they are asleep? What is a dishwasher when it isn't running? What is gunpowder when it doesn't explode? We all understand latent powers. To see them as a 'mystery' is to want to know too much.

The 18 ideas with the same theme [criticisms of the idea that there are 'powers' in reality]:

15983 Locke explains powers, but effectively eliminates them with his talk of internal structure [Locke, by Alexander,P]
13602 We cannot form an idea of a 'power', and the word is without meaning [Hume]
11950 We have no idea of powers, because we have no impressions of them [Hume]
11941 The distinction between a power and its exercise is entirely frivolous [Hume]
17772 Kant claims causal powers are relational rather than intrinsic [Kant, by Bayne]
14300 No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency [Ryle]
11946 Propensities are part of a situation, not part of the objects [Popper]
18397 Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result [Armstrong]
18399 How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over? [Armstrong]
17666 Actualism means that ontology cannot contain what is merely physically possible [Armstrong]
17667 Dispositions exist, but their truth-makers are actual or categorical properties [Armstrong]
17687 If everything is powers there is a vicious regress, as powers are defined by more powers [Armstrong]
8573 Most properties are causally irrelevant, and we can't spot the relevant ones. [Lewis]
14323 If every event has a cause, it is easy to invent a power to explain each case [Mumford]
14328 Traditional powers initiate change, but are mysterious between those changes [Mumford]
14331 Categorical eliminativists say there are no dispositions, just categorical states or mechanisms [Mumford]
14582 Might dispositions be reduced to normativity, or to intentionality? [Mumford/Anjum]
19014 How can spatiotemporal relations be understood in dispositional terms? [Vetter]