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Single Idea 14329
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
]
Full Idea
There is no a priori necessity for supposing that all disposition properties must have a 'categorical base'. In particular, there may be some mental dispositions which are ultimate.
Gist of Idea
Some dispositional properties (such as mental ones) may have no categorical base
Source
H.H. Price (Thinking and Experience [1953], Ch.XI)
Book Ref
Price,H.H.: 'Thinking and Experience' [Hutchinson 1953], p.322
A Reaction
I take the notion that mental dispositions could be ultimate as rather old-fashioned, but I agree with the notion that dispositions might be more fundamental that categorical (actual) properties. Personally I like 'powers'.
The
39 ideas
with the same theme
[powers seen as the foundation of physical reality]:
15773
|
Actualities are arranged by priority, going back to what initiates process
[Aristotle]
|
11387
|
The main characteristic of the source of change is activity [energeia]
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
18451
|
The presence of the incorporeal is only known by certain kinds of disposition
[Porphyry]
|
16635
|
Incorporeal substances are powers or forces
[Descartes, by Pasnau]
|
17195
|
Things persevere through a force which derives from God
[Spinoza]
|
17011
|
I suspect that each particle of bodies has attractive or repelling forces
[Newton]
|
12710
|
As well as extension, bodies contain powers
[Leibniz]
|
12965
|
All occurrence in the depth of a substance is spontaneous 'action'
[Leibniz]
|
12999
|
Substances are primary powers; their ways of being are the derivative powers
[Leibniz]
|
13079
|
A substance contains the laws of its operations, and its actions come from its own depth
[Leibniz]
|
12749
|
Derivate forces are in phenomena, but primitive forces are in the internal strivings of substances
[Leibniz]
|
12708
|
The soul is not a substance but a substantial form, the first active faculty
[Leibniz]
|
12723
|
The most primitive thing in substances is force, which leads to their actions and dispositions
[Leibniz]
|
23664
|
Powers are quite distinct and simple, and so cannot be defined
[Reid]
|
23669
|
Thinkers say that matter has intrinsic powers, but is also passive and acted upon
[Reid]
|
23228
|
The principle of activity and generation is found in a self-moving basic force
[Fichte]
|
17534
|
A 'probability wave' is a quantitative version of Aristotle's potential, a mid-way type of reality
[Heisenberg]
|
14329
|
Some dispositional properties (such as mental ones) may have no categorical base
[Price,HH]
|
15487
|
If unmanifested partnerless dispositions are still real, and are not just qualities, they can explain properties
[Martin,CB]
|
12676
|
Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power
[Ellis]
|
15218
|
Scientists define copper almost entirely (bar atomic number) in terms of its dispositions
[Harré/Madden]
|
15302
|
We explain powers by the natures of things, but explanations end in inexplicable powers
[Harré/Madden]
|
15303
|
Maybe a physical field qualifies as ultimate, if its nature is identical with its powers
[Harré/Madden]
|
9476
|
If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them
[Bird on Lewis]
|
11934
|
The physical world has a feature very like mental intentionality
[Molnar]
|
11947
|
Dispositions and external powers arise entirely from intrinsic powers in objects
[Molnar]
|
11952
|
The Standard Model suggest that particles are entirely dispositional, and hence are powers
[Molnar]
|
11953
|
Some powers are ungrounded, and others rest on them, and are derivative
[Molnar]
|
16556
|
Penicillin causes nothing; the cause is what penicillin does
[Machamer/Darden/Craver]
|
14294
|
Dispositions are attacked as mere regularities of events, or place-holders for unknown properties
[Mumford]
|
9446
|
Properties are just natural clusters of powers
[Mumford]
|
17996
|
Powers are claimed to be basic because fundamental particles lack internal structure
[Psillos]
|
15127
|
A categorical basis could hardly explain a disposition if it had no powers of its own
[Hawthorne]
|
14540
|
Only real powers are fundamental
[Bird, by Mumford/Anjum]
|
23771
|
Fundamental physics describes everything in terms of powers
[Williams,NE]
|
12467
|
Powers come from concrete particulars, not from the laws of nature
[Jacobs]
|
14555
|
Powers offer no more explanation of nature than laws do
[Mumford/Anjum]
|
22632
|
Physics understands the charge of an electron as a power, not as a quality
[Ingthorsson]
|
23714
|
Dispositional essentialism (unlike the grounding view) says only fundamental properties are powers
[Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
|