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Single Idea 14330

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions ]

Full Idea

It is only to the extent that we relate disposition to 'categorical basis', and difference of disposition to difference of 'categorical basis', that we can speak of dispositions. We must be Realists, not Phenomenalists, about dispositions.

Clarification

'Categorical' is the opposite of 'hypothetical'

Gist of Idea

To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis

Source

David M. Armstrong (A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev) [1968], 6.VI)

Book Ref

Armstrong,D.M.: 'A Materialist Theory of Mind' [Routledge 1993], p.88

A Reaction

It is Armstrong's realism which motivates this claim, because he thinks only categorical properties are real. But categorical properties seem to be passive, and the world is active.

The 25 ideas with the same theme [idea of a disposition towards certain behaviour]:

16735 In the 17th century, 'disposition' usually just means the spatial arrangement of parts [Boyle, by Pasnau]
14292 Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman]
16948 Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine]
15723 Either dispositions rest on structures, or we keep saying 'all things being equal' [Quine]
15469 Dispositions in action can be destroyed, be recovered, or remain unchanged [Martin,CB]
14330 To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis [Armstrong]
5458 Nearly all fundamental properties of physics are dispositional [Ellis]
13585 The most fundamental properties of nature (mass, charge, spin ...) all seem to be dispositions [Ellis]
16452 Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually [Stalnaker]
14308 We can bring dispositions into existence, as in creating an identifier [Dennett, by Mumford]
11943 Dispositions can be causes, so they must be part of the actual world [Molnar]
7025 Are a property's dispositions built in, or contingently added? [Heil]
14293 Dispositions are ascribed to at least objects, substances and persons [Mumford]
14298 Dispositions can be contrasted either with occurrences, or with categorical properties [Mumford]
14326 Unlike categorical bases, dispositions necessarily occupy a particular causal role [Mumford]
14583 Dispositionality is a natural selection function, picking outcomes from the range of possibilities [Mumford/Anjum]
16788 Instead of adding Aristotelian forms to physical stuff, one could add dispositions [Pasnau]
19021 I have an 'iterated ability' to learn the violin - that is, the ability to acquire that ability [Vetter]
23698 Dispositions have directed behaviour which occurs if triggered [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
23699 'Masked' dispositions fail to react because something intervenes [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
23700 A disposition is 'altered' when the stimulus reverses the disposition [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
23701 A disposition is 'mimicked' if a different cause produces that effect from that stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
23702 A 'trick' can look like a stimulus for a disposition which will happen without it [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
23703 Some dispositions manifest themselves without a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
23704 We could analyse dispositions as 'possibilities', with no mention of a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]