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Full Idea
I will consider the case for an ontology of real dispositions replacing the so-called laws of nature as the basic building blocks of explanation.
Gist of Idea
Maybe dispositions can replace the 'laws of nature' as the basis of explanation
Source
Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 10.1)
Book Ref
Mumford,Stephen: 'Dispositions' [OUP 1998], p.216
A Reaction
This precisely summarises the view I am exploring, with a particular focus on real essences. I certainly think the 'laws of nature' must go. See Mumford's second book on this.
| 16737 | The best explanations get down to primary basics, but others go less deep [Boyle] |
| 12737 | Nature can be fully explained by final causes alone, or by efficient causes alone [Leibniz] |
| 14873 | If we find a hypothesis that explains many things, we conclude that it explains everything [Nietzsche] |
| 12176 | Science does not aim at ultimate explanations [Popper] |
| 3128 | It's not at all clear that explanation needs to stop anywhere [Rey] |
| 15057 | Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding [Fine,K] |
| 16564 | There are four types of bottom-level activities which will explain phenomena [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 14320 | Subatomic particles may terminate explanation, if they lack structure [Mumford] |
| 14337 | Maybe dispositions can replace the 'laws of nature' as the basis of explanation [Mumford] |
| 14343 | To avoid a regress in explanations, ungrounded dispositions will always have to be posited [Mumford] |
| 15011 | If the ultimate explanation is a list of entities, no laws, patterns or mechanisms can be cited [Sider] |
| 14389 | There is nothing wrong with an infinite regress of mechanisms and regularities [Leuridan] |