more on this theme     |     more from this thinker

Single Idea 14339

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities ]

Full Idea

The problem is how, without general laws, can the dispositionalist explain why generalities in behaviour are true of kinds.

Gist of Idea

Without laws, how can a dispositionalist explain general behaviour within kinds?

Source

Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 10.3)

Book Ref

Mumford,Stephen: 'Dispositions' [OUP 1998], p.221

A Reaction

And the answer is to make kinds depend on individuals, and not vice versa, and then point to the necessary patterns that arise from conjunctions of individual dispositions, given their identity in many individuals.

The 41 ideas from 'Dispositions'

14291 Dispositions are not just possibilities - they are features of actual things [Mumford]
14294 Dispositions are attacked as mere regularities of events, or place-holders for unknown properties [Mumford]
14293 Dispositions are ascribed to at least objects, substances and persons [Mumford]
14295 Many artefacts have dispositional essences, which make them what they are [Mumford]
14299 There could be dispositions that are never manifested [Mumford]
14298 Dispositions can be contrasted either with occurrences, or with categorical properties [Mumford]
14302 A lead molecule is not leaden, and macroscopic properties need not be microscopically present [Mumford]
14306 Anti-realists deny truth-values to all statements, and say evidence and ontology are inseparable [Mumford]
14307 Some dispositions are so far unknown, until we learn how to manifest them [Mumford]
14309 Truth-functional conditionals can't distinguish whether they are causal or accidental [Mumford]
14310 Dispositions are classifications of properties by functional role [Mumford]
14313 All properties must be causal powers (since they wouldn't exist otherwise) [Mumford]
14311 Dispositions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals [Mumford]
14312 Orthodoxy says dispositions entail conditionals (rather than being equivalent to them) [Mumford]
14314 If dispositions are powers, background conditions makes it hard to say what they do [Mumford]
14315 Categorical properties and dispositions appear to explain one another [Mumford]
14316 If dispositions have several categorical realisations, that makes the two separate [Mumford]
14317 I say the categorical base causes the disposition manifestation [Mumford]
14318 Intrinsic properties are just causal powers, and identifying a property as causal is then analytic [Mumford]
14320 Subatomic particles may terminate explanation, if they lack structure [Mumford]
14319 Nomothetic explanations cite laws, and structural explanations cite mechanisms [Mumford]
14322 If fragile just means 'breaks when dropped', it won't explain a breakage [Mumford]
14323 If every event has a cause, it is easy to invent a power to explain each case [Mumford]
14324 Ontology is unrelated to explanation, which concerns modes of presentation and states of knowledge [Mumford]
14325 Maybe dispositions can replace powers in metaphysics, as what induces property change [Mumford]
14328 Traditional powers initiate change, but are mysterious between those changes [Mumford]
14326 Unlike categorical bases, dispositions necessarily occupy a particular causal role [Mumford]
14331 Categorical eliminativists say there are no dispositions, just categorical states or mechanisms [Mumford]
14332 There are four reasons for seeing categorical properties as the most fundamental [Mumford]
14333 Dispositions and categorical properties are two modes of presentation of the same thing [Mumford]
14334 Modest realism says there is a reality; the presumptuous view says we can accurately describe it [Mumford]
14336 Categorical predicates are those unconnected to functions [Mumford]
14337 Maybe dispositions can replace the 'laws of nature' as the basis of explanation [Mumford]
14338 In the 'laws' view events are basic, and properties are categorical, only existing when manifested [Mumford]
14339 Without laws, how can a dispositionalist explain general behaviour within kinds? [Mumford]
14341 Dretske and Armstrong base laws on regularities between individual properties, not between events [Mumford]
14340 It is a regularity that whenever a person sneezes, someone (somewhere) promptly coughs [Mumford]
14343 To avoid a regress in explanations, ungrounded dispositions will always have to be posited [Mumford]
14342 General laws depend upon the capacities of particulars, not the other way around [Mumford]
14344 Natural kinds, such as electrons, all behave the same way because we divide them by dispositions [Mumford]
14345 The necessity of an electron being an electron is conceptual, and won't ground necessary laws [Mumford]