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Full Idea
The nature of explanation is such that ungrounded dispositions will always have to be posited in order to avoid a regress of explanation.
Gist of Idea
To avoid a regress in explanations, ungrounded dispositions will always have to be posited
Source
Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 10.6)
Book Ref
Mumford,Stephen: 'Dispositions' [OUP 1998], p.232
A Reaction
This seems to be right, but leaves it open to mock the proposals as 'virtus dormitiva' - empty place-holders that ground explanations but do no explanatory work. What else can be done, though?
| 16737 | The best explanations get down to primary basics, but others go less deep [Boyle] |
| 12737 | Nature can be fully explained by final causes alone, or by efficient causes alone [Leibniz] |
| 14873 | If we find a hypothesis that explains many things, we conclude that it explains everything [Nietzsche] |
| 12176 | Science does not aim at ultimate explanations [Popper] |
| 3128 | It's not at all clear that explanation needs to stop anywhere [Rey] |
| 15057 | Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding [Fine,K] |
| 16564 | There are four types of bottom-level activities which will explain phenomena [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 14320 | Subatomic particles may terminate explanation, if they lack structure [Mumford] |
| 14337 | Maybe dispositions can replace the 'laws of nature' as the basis of explanation [Mumford] |
| 14343 | To avoid a regress in explanations, ungrounded dispositions will always have to be posited [Mumford] |
| 15011 | If the ultimate explanation is a list of entities, no laws, patterns or mechanisms can be cited [Sider] |
| 14389 | There is nothing wrong with an infinite regress of mechanisms and regularities [Leuridan] |