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Single Idea 14349

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws ]

Full Idea

Bird argues that there are no finks at the fundamental level, and unlikely to be any antidotes. It then follows that laws at the fundamental level will all be strict - not ceteris paribus - laws.

Clarification

'ceteris paribus' means 'other things being equal'

Gist of Idea

If there are no finks or antidotes at the fundamental level, the laws can't be ceteris paribus

Source

report of Tyler Burge (Intellectual Norms and Foundations of Mind [1986]) by Richard Corry - Dispositional Essentialism Grounds Laws of Nature? 3

Book Ref

-: 'Australasian Journal of Philosophy' [-], p.5


A Reaction

[Bird's main target is Nancy Cartwright 1999] This is a nice line of argument. Isn't part of the ceteris paribus problem that two fundamental laws might interfere with one another?

Related Ideas

Idea 14347 A 'finkish' disposition is one that is lost immediately after the appropriate stimulus [Corry]

Idea 14348 An 'antidote' allows a manifestation to begin, but then blocks it [Corry]


The 14 ideas from Tyler Burge

Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge]
Is apriority predicated mainly of truths and proofs, or of human cognition? [Burge]
The equivalent algebra model of geometry loses some essential spatial meaning [Burge]
Peano arithmetic requires grasping 0 as a primitive number [Burge]
You can't simply convert geometry into algebra, as some spatial content is lost [Burge]
We come to believe mathematical propositions via their grounding in the structure [Burge]
Given that thinking aims at truth, logic gives universal rules for how to do it [Burge]
Are meaning and expressed concept the same thing? [Burge, by Segal]
If there are no finks or antidotes at the fundamental level, the laws can't be ceteris paribus [Burge, by Corry]
Anti-individualism says the environment is involved in the individuation of some mental states [Burge]
Broad concepts suggest an extension of the mind into the environment (less computer-like) [Burge]
Anti-individualism may be incompatible with some sorts of self-knowledge [Burge]
Some qualities of experience, like blurred vision, have no function at all [Burge]
We now have a much more sophisticated understanding of logical form in language [Burge]