more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 14356

[filed under theme 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals ]

Full Idea

One addition to the truth functional account of conditionals is that A be somehow relevant to B. However, sometimes we use conditionals to express lack of relevance, as in 'If Fred works he will fail, and if Fred doesn't work he will fail'.

Gist of Idea

We can't insist that A is relevant to B, as conditionals can express lack of relevance

Source

Frank Jackson (Conditionals [2006], 'Possible')

Book Ref

'Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Language', ed/tr. Devitt,M/Hanley,R [Blackwell 2006], p.214


A Reaction

This certainly seems to put paid to an attractive instant solution to the problem.


The 6 ideas with the same theme [practical conventions for uttering conditional statements]:

A person can be justified in believing a proposition, though it is unreasonable to actually say it [Grice, by Edgington]
Conditionals are truth-functional, but unassertable in tricky cases? [Grice, by Read]
Sentences with 'if' are only conditionals if they can read as A-implies-B [Enderton]
We can't insist that A is relevant to B, as conditionals can express lack of relevance [Jackson]
Truth-functionalists support some conditionals which we assert, but should not actually believe [Edgington]
Does 'If A,B' say something different in each context, because of the possibiites there? [Edgington]