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Single Idea 14359

[filed under theme 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals ]

Full Idea

In the no-truth theory of conditionals they have justified assertion or acceptability conditions but not truth conditions. ...The motivation is that only assertions have truth values, and conditionals are arguments, not proper assertions.

Gist of Idea

Only assertions have truth-values, and conditionals are not proper assertions

Source

Frank Jackson (Conditionals [2006], 'No-truth')

Book Ref

'Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Language', ed/tr. Devitt,M/Hanley,R [Blackwell 2006], p.219

A Reaction

Once I trim this idea down to its basics, it suddenly looks very persuasive. Except that I am inclined to think that conditional truths do state facts about the world - perhaps as facts about how more basic truths are related to each other.

The 15 ideas with the same theme [conditional truth adding to the components]:

14304 Conditionals are true when the antecedent is true, and the consequent has to be true [Diod.Cronus]
14303 Truth-functional conditionals have a simple falsification, when A is true and B is false [Peirce]
10993 Ramsey's Test: believe the consequent if you believe the antecedent [Ramsey, by Read]
13766 'If' is the same as 'given that', so the degrees of belief should conform to probability theory [Ramsey, by Ramsey]
14358 In the possible worlds account of conditionals, modus ponens and modus tollens are validated [Jackson]
14359 Only assertions have truth-values, and conditionals are not proper assertions [Jackson]
14357 Possible worlds account, unlike A⊃B, says nothing about when A is false [Jackson]
10994 Conditionals are true if minimal revision of the antecedent verifies the consequent [Stalnaker, by Read]
14271 Non-truth-functionalist say 'If A,B' is false if A is T and B is F, but deny that is always true for TT,FT and FF [Edgington]
14272 I say "If you touch that wire you'll get a shock"; you don't touch it. How can that make the conditional true? [Edgington]
13855 A conditional does not have truth conditions [Edgington]
13859 X believes 'if A, B' to the extent that A & B is more likely than A & ¬B [Edgington]
14311 Dispositions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals [Mumford]
14185 Conditionals are just a shorthand for some proof, leaving out the details [Read]
8949 In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher]