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Full Idea
In the no-truth theory of conditionals they have justified assertion or acceptability conditions but not truth conditions. ...The motivation is that only assertions have truth values, and conditionals are arguments, not proper assertions.
Gist of Idea
Only assertions have truth-values, and conditionals are not proper assertions
Source
Frank Jackson (Conditionals [2006], 'No-truth')
Book Ref
'Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Language', ed/tr. Devitt,M/Hanley,R [Blackwell 2006], p.219
A Reaction
Once I trim this idea down to its basics, it suddenly looks very persuasive. Except that I am inclined to think that conditional truths do state facts about the world - perhaps as facts about how more basic truths are related to each other.
| 14353 | Modus ponens requires that A→B is F when A is T and B is F [Jackson] |
| 14354 | When A and B have the same truth value, A→B is true, because A→A is a logical truth [Jackson] |
| 14355 | (A&B)→A is a logical truth, even if antecedent false and consequent true, so it is T if A is F and B is T [Jackson] |
| 14352 | '¬', '&', and 'v' are truth functions: the truth of the compound is fixed by the truth of the components [Jackson] |
| 14358 | In the possible worlds account of conditionals, modus ponens and modus tollens are validated [Jackson] |
| 14360 | Possible worlds for subjunctives (and dispositions), and no-truth for indicatives? [Jackson] |
| 14359 | Only assertions have truth-values, and conditionals are not proper assertions [Jackson] |
| 14357 | Possible worlds account, unlike A⊃B, says nothing about when A is false [Jackson] |
| 14356 | We can't insist that A is relevant to B, as conditionals can express lack of relevance [Jackson] |