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Full Idea
Subjunctive conditionals are intimately connected with dispositional properties and causation. ...Consequently, a position some find attractive is that possible worlds theory applies to subjunctives, while the no-truth theory applies to indicatives.
Clarification
'Subjunctive conditionals' are also called 'counterfactuals'
Gist of Idea
Possible worlds for subjunctives (and dispositions), and no-truth for indicatives?
Source
Frank Jackson (Conditionals [2006], 'Indicative')
Book Ref
'Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Language', ed/tr. Devitt,M/Hanley,R [Blackwell 2006], p.221
A Reaction
My intuitions are to reject this and favour a unified account, where both sorts of conditionals are mappings of the relationships among the facts of actuality. Nice slogan!
| 14353 | Modus ponens requires that A→B is F when A is T and B is F [Jackson] |
| 14354 | When A and B have the same truth value, A→B is true, because A→A is a logical truth [Jackson] |
| 14355 | (A&B)→A is a logical truth, even if antecedent false and consequent true, so it is T if A is F and B is T [Jackson] |
| 14352 | '¬', '&', and 'v' are truth functions: the truth of the compound is fixed by the truth of the components [Jackson] |
| 14358 | In the possible worlds account of conditionals, modus ponens and modus tollens are validated [Jackson] |
| 14360 | Possible worlds for subjunctives (and dispositions), and no-truth for indicatives? [Jackson] |
| 14359 | Only assertions have truth-values, and conditionals are not proper assertions [Jackson] |
| 14357 | Possible worlds account, unlike A⊃B, says nothing about when A is false [Jackson] |
| 14356 | We can't insist that A is relevant to B, as conditionals can express lack of relevance [Jackson] |