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Single Idea 14361

[filed under theme 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals ]

Full Idea

Unlike Stalnaker, Lewis holds that indicative conditionals have the truth conditions of material conditionals.

Gist of Idea

Lewis says indicative conditionals are truth-functional

Source

report of David Lewis (Counterfactuals [1973]) by Frank Jackson - Conditionals 'Further'

Book Ref

'Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Language', ed/tr. Devitt,M/Hanley,R [Blackwell 2006], p.224


A Reaction

Thus Lewis only uses the possible worlds account for subjunctive conditionals, where Stalnaker uses it for both. Lewis is defending the truth-functional account for the indicative conditionals.


The 3 ideas from 'Counterfactuals'

In good counterfactuals the consequent holds in world like ours except that the antecedent is true [Lewis, by Horwich]
Lewis says indicative conditionals are truth-functional [Lewis, by Jackson]
A law of nature is a general axiom of the deductive system that is best for simplicity and strength [Lewis]