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Single Idea 14362

[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity ]

Full Idea

Wiggins argues that Geach's Relative Identity is incompatible with the formal properties of identity, which include, besides transitivity, symmetry and reflexivity, the complete community of properties defined by the Indiscernibility of Identicals.

Clarification

The Indiscernibility of Identicals is often called Leibniz's Law

Gist of Idea

Relative Identity is incompatible with the Indiscernibility of Identicals

Source

report of David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed [2001]) by Peter F. Strawson - Review of 'Sameness and Substance' p.603

Book Ref

-: 'Mind' [-], p.603

A Reaction

The tricky part is that Wiggins then goes on to say that identity depends on sortals, which sounds very close to the Geach view. I find disentangling them tricky. See Idea 14363 for a helpful comment from Strawson.

Related Idea

Idea 14363 Identity a=b is only possible with some concept to give persistence and existence conditions [Wiggins, by Strawson,P]

The 18 ideas with the same theme [identity can only ever be in respect of some feature]:

16794 As an infant, Socrates was not the same body, but he was the same human being [Hobbes]
16795 Same person, man or substance are different identities, belonging to different ideas [Locke]
12153 Geach denies Frege's view, that 'being the same F' splits into being the same and being F [Perry on Frege]
17653 Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman]
16075 Denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory [Wasserman on Geach]
12152 Identity is relative. One must not say things are 'the same', but 'the same A as' [Geach]
17512 If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers]
13953 An act of ostension doesn't seem to need a 'sort' of thing, even of a very broad kind [Cartwright,R]
12155 Statements of 'relative identity' are really statements of resemblance [Perry]
14362 Relative Identity is incompatible with the Indiscernibility of Identicals [Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
11838 Relativity of Identity makes identity entirely depend on a category [Wiggins]
11847 To identify two items, we must have a common sort for them [Wiggins]
14755 Gallois is committed to identity with respect to times, and denial of simple identity [Gallois, by Sider]
8305 A clear idea of the kind of an object must precede a criterion of identity for it [Lowe]
10321 We sometimes apply identity without having a real criterion [Hale]
15185 We aren't clear about 'same stuff as this', so a principle of individuation is needed to identify it [Sidelle]
4640 If identity is based on 'true of X' instead of 'property of X' we get the Masked Man fallacy ('I know X but not Y') [Baggini /Fosl, by PG]
16074 Relative identity may reject transitivity, but that suggests that it isn't about 'identity' [Wasserman]