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Full Idea
The dispositional theory of biological functions is not unquestioned. The main alternative is the etiological theory: a component's effect is a function of that component if it has played an essential role in the causal history of its existence.
Clarification
'Etiology' concerns causation
Gist of Idea
Rather than dispositions, functions may be the element that brought a thing into existence
Source
Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §3)
Book Ref
-: 'Philosophy of Science' [-], p.8
A Reaction
[He cites S.D. Mitchell 2003] Presumably this account is meant to fit into a theory of evolution in biology. The obvious problem is where something comes into existence for one reason, and then acquires a new function (such as piano-playing).
| 12787 | Mechanisms can't explain on their own, as their models rest on pragmatic regularities [Leuridan] |
| 14384 | We can show that regularities and pragmatic laws are more basic than mechanisms [Leuridan] |
| 14382 | Pragmatic laws allow prediction and explanation, to the extent that reality is stable [Leuridan] |
| 14383 | A 'law of nature' is just a regularity, not some entity that causes the regularity [Leuridan] |
| 14385 | Strict regularities are rarely discovered in life sciences [Leuridan] |
| 14387 | Rather than dispositions, functions may be the element that brought a thing into existence [Leuridan] |
| 14386 | Mechanisms are ontologically dependent on regularities [Leuridan] |
| 12789 | Biological functions are explained by disposition, or by causal role [Leuridan] |
| 12790 | Generalisations must be invariant to explain anything [Leuridan] |
| 14388 | Mechanisms must produce macro-level regularities, but that needs micro-level regularities [Leuridan] |
| 14389 | There is nothing wrong with an infinite regress of mechanisms and regularities [Leuridan] |