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Full Idea
It is implausible that a claim asserting that a thing fails to exist is made true by - and so is appropriately about - some other, existing thing.
Gist of Idea
It is implausible that claims about non-existence are about existing things
Source
Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 3.V)
Book Ref
Merricks,Trenton: 'Truth and Ontology' [OUP 2007], p.64
Related Idea
Idea 18917 Existence and nonexistence are characteristics of the world, not of objects [Engelbretsen]
| 21544 | It seems that when a proposition is false, something must fail to subsist [Russell] |
| 15547 | Negative existentials have 'totality facts' as truthmakers [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 18377 | Negative truths have as truthmakers all states of affairs relevant to the truth [Armstrong] |
| 18382 | The nature of arctic animals is truthmaker for the absence of penguins there [Armstrong] |
| 15549 | If it were true that nothing at all existed, would that have a truthmaker? [Lewis] |
| 9139 | If nothing exists, no truthmakers could make 'Nothing exists' true [Sorensen] |
| 14394 | It is implausible that claims about non-existence are about existing things [Merricks] |
| 18479 | There are different types of truthmakers for different types of negative truth [MacBride] |
| 18477 | There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths [MacBride] |
| 18869 | Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded [Cameron] |