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Single Idea 14394

[filed under theme 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths ]

Full Idea

It is implausible that a claim asserting that a thing fails to exist is made true by - and so is appropriately about - some other, existing thing.

Gist of Idea

It is implausible that claims about non-existence are about existing things

Source

Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 3.V)

Book Ref

Merricks,Trenton: 'Truth and Ontology' [OUP 2007], p.64

Related Idea

Idea 18917 Existence and nonexistence are characteristics of the world, not of objects [Engelbretsen]

The 26 ideas from 'Truth and Ontology'

14390 Truthmaker isn't the correspondence theory, because it offers no analysis of truth [Merricks]
14391 If the correspondence theory is right, then necessary truths must correspond to something [Merricks]
14392 Fregeans say 'hobbits do not exist' is just 'being a hobbit' is not exemplified [Merricks]
14393 The totality state is the most plausible truthmaker for negative existential truths [Merricks]
14395 If a ball changes from red to white, Truthmaker says some thing must make the change true [Merricks]
14394 It is implausible that claims about non-existence are about existing things [Merricks]
14396 If 'truth supervenes on being', worlds with the same entities, properties and relations have the same truths [Merricks]
14397 Truthmaker demands not just a predication, but an existing state of affairs with essential ingredients [Merricks]
14398 Truthmaker says if an entity is removed, some nonexistence truthmaker must replace it [Merricks]
14400 If truth supervenes on being, that won't explain why truth depends on being [Merricks]
14402 If 'Fido is possibly black' depends on Fido's counterparts, then it has no actual truthmaker [Merricks]
14403 If Truthmaker says each truth is made by the existence of something, the theory had de re modality at is core [Merricks]
14406 Presentists say that things have existed and will exist, not that they are instantaneous [Merricks]
14407 Presentist should deny there is a present time, and just say that things 'exist' [Merricks]
14405 How can a presentist explain an object's having existed? [Merricks]
14408 Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear [Merricks]
14410 You believe you existed last year, but your segment doesn't, so they have different beliefs [Merricks]
14411 Maybe only presentism allows change, by now having a property, and then lacking it [Merricks]
14412 Speculations about non-existent things are not about existent things, so Truthmaker is false [Merricks]
14414 I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but is it about me? [Merricks]
14413 Some properties seem to be primitive, but others can be analysed [Merricks]
14415 A ground must be about its truth, and not just necessitate it [Merricks]
14416 An object can have a disposition when the revelant conditional is false [Merricks]
14417 Counterfactuals aren't about actuality, so they lack truthmakers or a supervenience base [Merricks]
14418 Being true is not a relation, it is a primitive monadic property [Merricks]
14419 Deflationism just says there is no property of being truth [Merricks]