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Single Idea 14402

[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts ]

Full Idea

If Fido's being possibly black reduces (in Lewis's account) to the existence of black counterparts of Fido, then 'Fido is possibly black' is actually true, but it has no actually existing truthmaker.

Gist of Idea

If 'Fido is possibly black' depends on Fido's counterparts, then it has no actual truthmaker

Source

Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 5.I)

Book Ref

Merricks,Trenton: 'Truth and Ontology' [OUP 2007], p.99

A Reaction

This problem is increasingly the target of my views about dispositions and powers. Fido is not possibly a prize-winning novelist, but is possibly dead or in good health, because of the actual nature and dispositions of Fido.

The 26 ideas from 'Truth and Ontology'

14390 Truthmaker isn't the correspondence theory, because it offers no analysis of truth [Merricks]
14391 If the correspondence theory is right, then necessary truths must correspond to something [Merricks]
14392 Fregeans say 'hobbits do not exist' is just 'being a hobbit' is not exemplified [Merricks]
14393 The totality state is the most plausible truthmaker for negative existential truths [Merricks]
14395 If a ball changes from red to white, Truthmaker says some thing must make the change true [Merricks]
14394 It is implausible that claims about non-existence are about existing things [Merricks]
14396 If 'truth supervenes on being', worlds with the same entities, properties and relations have the same truths [Merricks]
14397 Truthmaker demands not just a predication, but an existing state of affairs with essential ingredients [Merricks]
14398 Truthmaker says if an entity is removed, some nonexistence truthmaker must replace it [Merricks]
14400 If truth supervenes on being, that won't explain why truth depends on being [Merricks]
14402 If 'Fido is possibly black' depends on Fido's counterparts, then it has no actual truthmaker [Merricks]
14403 If Truthmaker says each truth is made by the existence of something, the theory had de re modality at is core [Merricks]
14406 Presentists say that things have existed and will exist, not that they are instantaneous [Merricks]
14407 Presentist should deny there is a present time, and just say that things 'exist' [Merricks]
14405 How can a presentist explain an object's having existed? [Merricks]
14408 Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear [Merricks]
14410 You believe you existed last year, but your segment doesn't, so they have different beliefs [Merricks]
14411 Maybe only presentism allows change, by now having a property, and then lacking it [Merricks]
14412 Speculations about non-existent things are not about existent things, so Truthmaker is false [Merricks]
14414 I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but is it about me? [Merricks]
14413 Some properties seem to be primitive, but others can be analysed [Merricks]
14415 A ground must be about its truth, and not just necessitate it [Merricks]
14416 An object can have a disposition when the revelant conditional is false [Merricks]
14417 Counterfactuals aren't about actuality, so they lack truthmakers or a supervenience base [Merricks]
14418 Being true is not a relation, it is a primitive monadic property [Merricks]
14419 Deflationism just says there is no property of being truth [Merricks]