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Single Idea 14412

[filed under theme 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers ]

Full Idea

That 'there might have been a dozen more fundamental particles' is true, but not appropriately about any existing entities or their properties. Since Truthmaker says that all truths are about existing entities, it must be false.

Gist of Idea

Speculations about non-existent things are not about existent things, so Truthmaker is false

Source

Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 6.VI)

Book Ref

Merricks,Trenton: 'Truth and Ontology' [OUP 2007], p.145


A Reaction

Since I don't necessarily agree that 'there might have been a dozen more fundamental particles' (see Scientific Essentialism), and I take the disagreement to have some basis, I doubt this idea. What stops 'there could be circular squares' from being true?


The 15 ideas with the same theme [opposing the claim that all truths have truthmakers]:

Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true [Davidson]
Slingshot Argument: seems to prove that all sentences have the same truth-maker [Oliver]
Which toothbrush is the truthmaker for 'buy one, get one free'? [Sorensen]
Truthmaker has problems with generalisation, non-existence claims, and property instantiations [Crisp,TM]
Speculations about non-existent things are not about existent things, so Truthmaker is false [Merricks]
I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but is it about me? [Merricks]
'Mickey Mouse is a fictional mouse' is true without a truthmaker [Azzouni]
Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have [MacBride]
Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent [MacBride]
Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'? [MacBride]
Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification [MacBride]
Truthmakers for existence is fine; otherwise maybe restrict it to synthetic truths? [Liggins]
Maybe analytic truths do not require truth-makers, as they place no demands on the world [Thomasson]
What is the truthmaker for a possible new power? [Tallant]
For idealists reality is like a collection of beliefs, so truths and truthmakers are not distinct [Young,JO]