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Single Idea 14414

[filed under theme 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers ]

Full Idea

I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but it is not obvious that that proposition is thus about me.

Gist of Idea

I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but is it about me?

Source

Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 7.I)

Book Ref

Merricks,Trenton: 'Truth and Ontology' [OUP 2007], p.152


A Reaction

This is part of the general rather good objection that it is often unclear what a truth is 'about' (Idea 14408). The original Gettier examples about justification illustrate this problem. They make things true, in a surprising way.

Related Idea

Idea 14408 Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear [Merricks]


The 15 ideas with the same theme [opposing the claim that all truths have truthmakers]:

Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true [Davidson]
Slingshot Argument: seems to prove that all sentences have the same truth-maker [Oliver]
Which toothbrush is the truthmaker for 'buy one, get one free'? [Sorensen]
Truthmaker has problems with generalisation, non-existence claims, and property instantiations [Crisp,TM]
Speculations about non-existent things are not about existent things, so Truthmaker is false [Merricks]
I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but is it about me? [Merricks]
'Mickey Mouse is a fictional mouse' is true without a truthmaker [Azzouni]
Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have [MacBride]
Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent [MacBride]
Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'? [MacBride]
Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification [MacBride]
Truthmakers for existence is fine; otherwise maybe restrict it to synthetic truths? [Liggins]
Maybe analytic truths do not require truth-makers, as they place no demands on the world [Thomasson]
What is the truthmaker for a possible new power? [Tallant]
For idealists reality is like a collection of beliefs, so truths and truthmakers are not distinct [Young,JO]