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Single Idea 14418
[filed under theme 3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
]
Full Idea
Being true is not a relation. …Being true is a monadic property. …Being true is a primitive property.
Gist of Idea
Being true is not a relation, it is a primitive monadic property
Source
Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 8.IV)
Book Ref
Merricks,Trenton: 'Truth and Ontology' [OUP 2007], p.182
A Reaction
Even after reading Merricks on this, I am not sure I understand it. If a single sentence floats in the void, it is hard to see how the 'monadic' property of truth could accrue to it.
The
28 ideas
with the same theme
[criticism of the correspondence theory of truth]:
20793
|
How could you ever know that the presentation is similar to the object?
[Sext.Empiricus on Chrysippus]
|
22309
|
An idea can only be like another idea
[Berkeley]
|
19465
|
There cannot be complete correspondence, because ideas and reality are quite different
[Frege]
|
18983
|
In many cases there is no obvious way in which ideas can agree with their object
[James]
|
16296
|
Tarski's Theorem renders any precise version of correspondence impossible
[Tarski, by Halbach]
|
13984
|
Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show
[Ryle]
|
10836
|
Correspondence theorists shouldn't think that a country has just one accurate map
[Austin,JL]
|
6277
|
Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible
[Putnam]
|
4716
|
The correspondence theory is wrong, because there is no one correspondence between reality and fact
[Putnam, by O'Grady]
|
23298
|
Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory
[Davidson]
|
18902
|
Correspondence theories can't tell you what truths correspond to
[Davidson]
|
19148
|
There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to
[Davidson]
|
19166
|
The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence
[Davidson]
|
19167
|
Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing
[Davidson]
|
2572
|
Logical truth seems much less likely to 'correspond to the facts' than factual truth does
[Haack]
|
10908
|
Correspondence has to invoke facts or states of affairs, just to serve as truth-makers
[Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
|
2768
|
The correspondence theory also has the problem that two sets of propositions might fit the facts equally well
[Dancy,J]
|
6332
|
The common-sense theory of correspondence has never been worked out satisfactorily
[Horwich]
|
3593
|
The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence
[Williams,M]
|
6084
|
'Snow does not fall' corresponds to snow does fall
[McGinn]
|
6085
|
The idea of truth is built into the idea of correspondence
[McGinn]
|
2959
|
If something is described in two different ways, is that two facts, or one fact presented in two ways?
[Lockwood]
|
8319
|
One-to-one correspondence would need countable, individuable items
[Lowe]
|
9594
|
Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth
[Williamson]
|
4744
|
We can't explain the corresponding structure of the world except by referring to our thoughts
[Engel]
|
14391
|
If the correspondence theory is right, then necessary truths must correspond to something
[Merricks]
|
14418
|
Being true is not a relation, it is a primitive monadic property
[Merricks]
|
15337
|
The correspondence 'theory' is too vague - about both 'correspondence' and 'facts'
[Horsten]
|