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Single Idea 14418
[filed under theme 3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
]
Full Idea
Being true is not a relation. …Being true is a monadic property. …Being true is a primitive property.
Gist of Idea
Being true is not a relation, it is a primitive monadic property
Source
Trenton Merricks (Truth and Ontology [2007], 8.IV)
Book Ref
Merricks,Trenton: 'Truth and Ontology' [OUP 2007], p.182
A Reaction
Even after reading Merricks on this, I am not sure I understand it. If a single sentence floats in the void, it is hard to see how the 'monadic' property of truth could accrue to it.
The
26 ideas
from 'Truth and Ontology'
14390
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Truthmaker isn't the correspondence theory, because it offers no analysis of truth
[Merricks]
|
14391
|
If the correspondence theory is right, then necessary truths must correspond to something
[Merricks]
|
14392
|
Fregeans say 'hobbits do not exist' is just 'being a hobbit' is not exemplified
[Merricks]
|
14393
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The totality state is the most plausible truthmaker for negative existential truths
[Merricks]
|
14394
|
It is implausible that claims about non-existence are about existing things
[Merricks]
|
14395
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If a ball changes from red to white, Truthmaker says some thing must make the change true
[Merricks]
|
14396
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If 'truth supervenes on being', worlds with the same entities, properties and relations have the same truths
[Merricks]
|
14397
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Truthmaker demands not just a predication, but an existing state of affairs with essential ingredients
[Merricks]
|
14398
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Truthmaker says if an entity is removed, some nonexistence truthmaker must replace it
[Merricks]
|
14400
|
If truth supervenes on being, that won't explain why truth depends on being
[Merricks]
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14402
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If 'Fido is possibly black' depends on Fido's counterparts, then it has no actual truthmaker
[Merricks]
|
14403
|
If Truthmaker says each truth is made by the existence of something, the theory had de re modality at is core
[Merricks]
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14406
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Presentists say that things have existed and will exist, not that they are instantaneous
[Merricks]
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14407
|
Presentist should deny there is a present time, and just say that things 'exist'
[Merricks]
|
14405
|
How can a presentist explain an object's having existed?
[Merricks]
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14408
|
Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear
[Merricks]
|
14410
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You believe you existed last year, but your segment doesn't, so they have different beliefs
[Merricks]
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14411
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Maybe only presentism allows change, by now having a property, and then lacking it
[Merricks]
|
14412
|
Speculations about non-existent things are not about existent things, so Truthmaker is false
[Merricks]
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14414
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I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but is it about me?
[Merricks]
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14413
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Some properties seem to be primitive, but others can be analysed
[Merricks]
|
14415
|
A ground must be about its truth, and not just necessitate it
[Merricks]
|
14416
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An object can have a disposition when the revelant conditional is false
[Merricks]
|
14417
|
Counterfactuals aren't about actuality, so they lack truthmakers or a supervenience base
[Merricks]
|
14418
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Being true is not a relation, it is a primitive monadic property
[Merricks]
|
14419
|
Deflationism just says there is no property of being truth
[Merricks]
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