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Single Idea 14466
[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
]
Full Idea
Showing how, reflectively, we can make sense of our unreflective common sense worldview is arguably one of the chief tasks of philosophy.
Gist of Idea
A chief task of philosophy is making reflective sense of our common sense worldview
Source
Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], Intro)
Book Ref
Thomasson,Amie L.: 'Ordinary Objects' [OUP 2010], p.3
A Reaction
Maybe. The obvious problem is that when you look at weird and remote cultures like the Aztecs, what counts as 'common sense' might be a bit different. She is talking of ordinary objects, though, where her point is reasonable.
The
21 ideas
from Amie L. Thomasson
21651
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It is analytic that if simples are arranged chair-wise, then there is a chair
[Thomasson, by Hofweber]
|
14467
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Ordinary objects are rejected, to avoid contradictions, or for greater economy in thought
[Thomasson]
|
14466
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A chief task of philosophy is making reflective sense of our common sense worldview
[Thomasson]
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14471
|
Analytical entailments arise from combinations of meanings and inference rules
[Thomasson]
|
14475
|
How can causal theories of reference handle nonexistence claims?
[Thomasson]
|
14474
|
Pure causal theories of reference have the 'qua problem', of what sort of things is being referred to
[Thomasson]
|
14476
|
Identity claims between objects are only well-formed if the categories are specified
[Thomasson]
|
14477
|
Identical entities must be of the same category, and meet the criteria for the category
[Thomasson]
|
14478
|
Modal Conventionalism says modality is analytic, not intrinsic to the world, and linguistic
[Thomasson]
|
14479
|
To individuate people we need conventions, but conventions are made up by people
[Thomasson]
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14480
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Maybe analytic truths do not require truth-makers, as they place no demands on the world
[Thomasson]
|
14481
|
Wherever an object exists, there are intrinsic properties instantiating every modal profile
[Thomasson]
|
14482
|
If the statue and the lump are two objects, they require separate properties, so we could add their masses
[Thomasson]
|
14483
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Given the similarity of statue and lump, what could possibly ground their modal properties?
[Thomasson]
|
14485
|
Ordinary objects may be not indispensable, but they are nearly unavoidable
[Thomasson]
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14487
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The simple existence conditions for objects are established by our practices, and are met
[Thomasson]
|
14486
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Eliminativists haven't found existence conditions for chairs, beyond those of the word 'chair'
[Thomasson]
|
14489
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Theories do not avoid commitment to entities by avoiding certain terms or concepts
[Thomasson]
|
14488
|
Analyticity is revealed through redundancy, as in 'He bought a house and a building'
[Thomasson]
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14491
|
Rival ontological claims can both be true, if there are analytic relationships between them
[Thomasson]
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14493
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Existence might require playing a role in explanation, or in a causal story, or being composed in some way
[Thomasson]
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