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Single Idea 14467

[filed under theme 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects ]

Full Idea

Objections to ordinary objects are the Causal Redundancy claim (objects lack causal powers), the Anti-Colocation view (statues and lumps overlap), Sorites arguments, a more economical ontology, or a more scientific ontology.

Gist of Idea

Ordinary objects are rejected, to avoid contradictions, or for greater economy in thought

Source

Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], Intro)

Book Ref

Thomasson,Amie L.: 'Ordinary Objects' [OUP 2010], p.4

A Reaction

[my summary of two paragraphs] The chief exponents of these views are Van Inwagen and Merricks. Before you glibly accept ordinary objects, you must focus on producing a really strict ontology. These arguments all have real force.

The 21 ideas from 'Ordinary Objects'

21651 It is analytic that if simples are arranged chair-wise, then there is a chair [Thomasson, by Hofweber]
14467 Ordinary objects are rejected, to avoid contradictions, or for greater economy in thought [Thomasson]
14466 A chief task of philosophy is making reflective sense of our common sense worldview [Thomasson]
14471 Analytical entailments arise from combinations of meanings and inference rules [Thomasson]
14475 How can causal theories of reference handle nonexistence claims? [Thomasson]
14474 Pure causal theories of reference have the 'qua problem', of what sort of things is being referred to [Thomasson]
14476 Identity claims between objects are only well-formed if the categories are specified [Thomasson]
14477 Identical entities must be of the same category, and meet the criteria for the category [Thomasson]
14478 Modal Conventionalism says modality is analytic, not intrinsic to the world, and linguistic [Thomasson]
14479 To individuate people we need conventions, but conventions are made up by people [Thomasson]
14480 Maybe analytic truths do not require truth-makers, as they place no demands on the world [Thomasson]
14481 Wherever an object exists, there are intrinsic properties instantiating every modal profile [Thomasson]
14482 If the statue and the lump are two objects, they require separate properties, so we could add their masses [Thomasson]
14483 Given the similarity of statue and lump, what could possibly ground their modal properties? [Thomasson]
14485 Ordinary objects may be not indispensable, but they are nearly unavoidable [Thomasson]
14486 Eliminativists haven't found existence conditions for chairs, beyond those of the word 'chair' [Thomasson]
14487 The simple existence conditions for objects are established by our practices, and are met [Thomasson]
14489 Theories do not avoid commitment to entities by avoiding certain terms or concepts [Thomasson]
14488 Analyticity is revealed through redundancy, as in 'He bought a house and a building' [Thomasson]
14491 Rival ontological claims can both be true, if there are analytic relationships between them [Thomasson]
14493 Existence might require playing a role in explanation, or in a causal story, or being composed in some way [Thomasson]