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Single Idea 14473

[filed under theme 19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique ]

Full Idea

Quine's attack argues against the Fregean attempt to define 'analyticity' in terms of synonymy - where analytical truths are logical truths ('unmarried men are unmarried'), or become logical truths by synonymous replacement ('bachelors are unmarried').

Gist of Idea

Quine attacks the Fregean idea that we can define analyticity through synonyous substitution

Source

report of Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953]) by Amie L. Thomasson - Ordinary Objects 02.1

Book Ref

Thomasson,Amie L.: 'Ordinary Objects' [OUP 2010], p.30


A Reaction

This is a very helpful explanation of what is going on in Quine. Why won't philosophers explain clearly what they are attacking, before they attack it?


The 17 ideas with the same theme [rejection of sharp distinction between real and verbal assertion]:

Concepts are only analytic once the predicate is absorbed into the subject [Schleiermacher]
When we explicate the category of being, we watch a new category emerge [Hegel, by Houlgate]
Frege fails to give a concept of analyticity, so he fails to explain synthetic a priori truth that way [Katz on Frege]
Holism in language blurs empirical synthetic and empty analytic sentences [Quine]
In observation sentences, we could substitute community acceptance for analyticity [Quine]
I will even consider changing a meaning to save a law; I question the meaning-fact cleavage [Quine]
Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori [Quine, by Boghossian]
Quine attacks the Fregean idea that we can define analyticity through synonyous substitution [Quine, by Thomasson]
The last two parts of 'Two Dogmas' are much the best [Miller,A on Quine]
Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language [Davidson on Quine]
The analytic needs excessively small units of meaning and empirical confirmation [Quine, by Jenkins]
Did someone ever actually define 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'? [Quine]
If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity [Quine]
The distinction between meaning and further information is as vague as the essence/accident distinction [Quine]
If we claim direct insight to what is analytic, how do we know it is not sub-consciously empirical? [Rey]
The Quinean doubt: are semantics and facts separate, and do analytic sentences have no factual part? [Fine,K]
Analyticity has lost its traditional role, which relied on truth by convention [Sider]