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Single Idea 14474

[filed under theme 19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference ]

Full Idea

Pure causal theories of reference face the 'qua problem' - that it may be radically indeterminate what the term refers to unless there is some very basic concept of what sort of thing is being referred to.

Gist of Idea

Pure causal theories of reference have the 'qua problem', of what sort of things is being referred to

Source

Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 02.3)

Book Ref

Thomasson,Amie L.: 'Ordinary Objects' [OUP 2010], p.38

A Reaction

She cites Dummett and Wiggins on this. There is an obvious problem that when I say 'look at that!' there are all sorts of conventions at work if my reference is to succeed.

The 21 ideas from 'Ordinary Objects'

21651 It is analytic that if simples are arranged chair-wise, then there is a chair [Thomasson, by Hofweber]
14467 Ordinary objects are rejected, to avoid contradictions, or for greater economy in thought [Thomasson]
14466 A chief task of philosophy is making reflective sense of our common sense worldview [Thomasson]
14471 Analytical entailments arise from combinations of meanings and inference rules [Thomasson]
14475 How can causal theories of reference handle nonexistence claims? [Thomasson]
14474 Pure causal theories of reference have the 'qua problem', of what sort of things is being referred to [Thomasson]
14476 Identity claims between objects are only well-formed if the categories are specified [Thomasson]
14477 Identical entities must be of the same category, and meet the criteria for the category [Thomasson]
14478 Modal Conventionalism says modality is analytic, not intrinsic to the world, and linguistic [Thomasson]
14479 To individuate people we need conventions, but conventions are made up by people [Thomasson]
14480 Maybe analytic truths do not require truth-makers, as they place no demands on the world [Thomasson]
14481 Wherever an object exists, there are intrinsic properties instantiating every modal profile [Thomasson]
14482 If the statue and the lump are two objects, they require separate properties, so we could add their masses [Thomasson]
14483 Given the similarity of statue and lump, what could possibly ground their modal properties? [Thomasson]
14485 Ordinary objects may be not indispensable, but they are nearly unavoidable [Thomasson]
14486 Eliminativists haven't found existence conditions for chairs, beyond those of the word 'chair' [Thomasson]
14487 The simple existence conditions for objects are established by our practices, and are met [Thomasson]
14489 Theories do not avoid commitment to entities by avoiding certain terms or concepts [Thomasson]
14488 Analyticity is revealed through redundancy, as in 'He bought a house and a building' [Thomasson]
14491 Rival ontological claims can both be true, if there are analytic relationships between them [Thomasson]
14493 Existence might require playing a role in explanation, or in a causal story, or being composed in some way [Thomasson]