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Single Idea 14476

[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects ]

Full Idea

Identity claims are only well-formed and truth-evaluable if the terms flanking the statement are associated with a certain category of entity each is to refer to, which disambiguates the reference and identity-criteria.

Gist of Idea

Identity claims between objects are only well-formed if the categories are specified

Source

Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 03)

Book Ref

Thomasson,Amie L.: 'Ordinary Objects' [OUP 2010], p.57


A Reaction

The first of her two criteria for identity. She is buying the full Wiggins package.

Related Idea

Idea 14477 Identical entities must be of the same category, and meet the criteria for the category [Thomasson]


The 21 ideas from 'Ordinary Objects'

It is analytic that if simples are arranged chair-wise, then there is a chair [Thomasson, by Hofweber]
Ordinary objects are rejected, to avoid contradictions, or for greater economy in thought [Thomasson]
A chief task of philosophy is making reflective sense of our common sense worldview [Thomasson]
Analytical entailments arise from combinations of meanings and inference rules [Thomasson]
How can causal theories of reference handle nonexistence claims? [Thomasson]
Pure causal theories of reference have the 'qua problem', of what sort of things is being referred to [Thomasson]
Identity claims between objects are only well-formed if the categories are specified [Thomasson]
Identical entities must be of the same category, and meet the criteria for the category [Thomasson]
Modal Conventionalism says modality is analytic, not intrinsic to the world, and linguistic [Thomasson]
To individuate people we need conventions, but conventions are made up by people [Thomasson]
Maybe analytic truths do not require truth-makers, as they place no demands on the world [Thomasson]
Wherever an object exists, there are intrinsic properties instantiating every modal profile [Thomasson]
If the statue and the lump are two objects, they require separate properties, so we could add their masses [Thomasson]
Given the similarity of statue and lump, what could possibly ground their modal properties? [Thomasson]
Ordinary objects may be not indispensable, but they are nearly unavoidable [Thomasson]
Eliminativists haven't found existence conditions for chairs, beyond those of the word 'chair' [Thomasson]
The simple existence conditions for objects are established by our practices, and are met [Thomasson]
Theories do not avoid commitment to entities by avoiding certain terms or concepts [Thomasson]
Analyticity is revealed through redundancy, as in 'He bought a house and a building' [Thomasson]
Rival ontological claims can both be true, if there are analytic relationships between them [Thomasson]
Existence might require playing a role in explanation, or in a causal story, or being composed in some way [Thomasson]