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Single Idea 14479
[filed under theme 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
]
Full Idea
The conventionalist faces paradox if they hold that conventions are logically prior to people (since this plurality requires conventions of individuation), and people are logically prior to conventions (if they make up the conventions).
Gist of Idea
To individuate people we need conventions, but conventions are made up by people
Source
Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 03.3)
Book Ref
Thomasson,Amie L.: 'Ordinary Objects' [OUP 2010], p.68
A Reaction
[Sidelle is the spokesman for conventionalism] The best defence would be to deny the second part, and say that conventions emerge from whatever is there, but only conventions can individuate the bits of what is there.
The
29 ideas
with the same theme
[denial that there are such things as unified objects]:
13782
|
Everything gives way, and nothing stands fast
[Heraclitus]
|
13209
|
There is no coming-to-be of anything, but only mixing and separating
[Empedocles, by Aristotle]
|
15855
|
If we see everything as separate, we can then give no account of it
[Plato]
|
1687
|
Why are being terrestrial and a biped combined in the definition of man, but being literate and musical aren't?
[Aristotle]
|
12953
|
Fluidity is basic, and we divide into bodies according to our needs
[Leibniz]
|
7189
|
Maybe there are only subjects, and 'objects' result from relations between subjects
[Nietzsche]
|
18314
|
In language we treat 'ego' as a substance, and it is thus that we create the concept 'thing'
[Nietzsche]
|
18987
|
A 'thing' is simply carved out of reality for human purposes
[James]
|
13935
|
We only accept 'things' within a language with formation, testing and acceptance rules
[Carnap]
|
8969
|
We should abandon absolute identity, confining it to within some category
[Geach, by Hawthorne]
|
15272
|
The good criticism of substance by Humeans also loses them the vital concept of a thing
[Harré/Madden]
|
17565
|
Nihilism says composition between single things is impossible
[Inwagen]
|
14228
|
If there are no tables, but tables are things arranged tablewise, the denial of tables is a contradiction
[Liggins on Inwagen]
|
14468
|
Actions by artefacts and natural bodies are disguised cooperations, so we don't need them
[Inwagen]
|
13384
|
Objects need conventions for their matter, their temporal possibility, and their spatial possibility
[Jubien]
|
13385
|
Basically, the world doesn't have ready-made 'objects'; we carve objects any way we like
[Jubien]
|
4206
|
Conventionalists see the world as an amorphous lump without identities, but are we part of the lump?
[Lowe]
|
14229
|
Merricks agrees that there are no composite objects, but offers a different semantics
[Merricks, by Liggins]
|
6142
|
The 'folk' way of carving up the world is not intrinsically better than quite arbitrary ways
[Merricks]
|
14472
|
If atoms 'arranged baseballwise' break a window, that analytically entails that a baseball did it
[Merricks, by Thomasson]
|
14469
|
Overdetermination: the atoms do all the causing, so the baseball causes no breakage
[Merricks]
|
21652
|
Our perceptual beliefs are about ordinary objects, not about simples arranged chair-wise
[Hofweber]
|
14927
|
Physics seems to imply that we must give up self-subsistent individuals
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14944
|
There is no single view of individuals, because different sciences operate on different scales
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
14946
|
There are no cats in quantum theory, and no mountains in astrophysics
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
21651
|
It is analytic that if simples are arranged chair-wise, then there is a chair
[Thomasson, by Hofweber]
|
14467
|
Ordinary objects are rejected, to avoid contradictions, or for greater economy in thought
[Thomasson]
|
14479
|
To individuate people we need conventions, but conventions are made up by people
[Thomasson]
|
14486
|
Eliminativists haven't found existence conditions for chairs, beyond those of the word 'chair'
[Thomasson]
|