more from this thinker
|
more from this text
Single Idea 14484
[filed under theme 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
]
Full Idea
We cannot accept the existence of vague objects, according to Evans's argument that there cannot be indeterminacy of identity. ...From the assumption that it is indeterminate whether a = b, we conclude, determinately, that it's not the case that a = b.
Gist of Idea
If a=b is indeterminate, then a=/=b, and so there cannot be indeterminate identity
Source
report of Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978]) by Amie L. Thomasson - Ordinary Objects 05.6
Book Ref
Thomasson,Amie L.: 'Ordinary Objects' [OUP 2010], p.107
A Reaction
I think we should keep intrinsic identity separate from identity between entities. A cloud can be clearly identified, while being a bit fuzzy. It is only when you ask whether we saw the same cloud that Evans's argument seems relevant.
The
29 ideas
with the same theme
[distinct objects with uncertain boundaries]:
11853
|
A mixed drink separates if it is not stirred
[Heraclitus]
|
12986
|
The essence of baldness is vague and imperfect
[Leibniz]
|
14797
|
Vagueness is a neglected but important part of mathematical thought
[Peirce]
|
14798
|
All communication is vague, and is outside the principle of non-contradiction
[Peirce]
|
9891
|
The first demand of logic is of a sharp boundary
[Frege]
|
9388
|
Every concept must have a sharp boundary; we cannot allow an indeterminate third case
[Frege]
|
14484
|
If a=b is indeterminate, then a=/=b, and so there cannot be indeterminate identity
[Evans, by Thomasson]
|
11852
|
Is the Pope's crown one crown, if it is made of many crowns?
[Wiggins]
|
11875
|
Boundaries are not crucial to mountains, so they are determinate without a determinate extent
[Wiggins]
|
15536
|
We have one cloud, but many possible boundaries and aggregates for it
[Lewis]
|
8982
|
Vague concepts are concepts without boundaries
[Sainsbury]
|
8984
|
If concepts are vague, people avoid boundaries, can't spot them, and don't want them
[Sainsbury]
|
8985
|
Boundaryless concepts tend to come in pairs, such as child/adult, hot/cold
[Sainsbury]
|
23545
|
We do not have an intelligible concept of a borderline case
[Fine,K]
|
9769
|
Vagueness can be in predicates, names or quantifiers
[Fine,K]
|
10275
|
A blurry border is still a border
[Shapiro]
|
9045
|
Vague predicates involve uncertain properties, uncertain objects, and paradoxes of gradual change
[Keefe/Smith]
|
9047
|
Many vague predicates are multi-dimensional; 'big' involves height and volume; heaps include arrangement
[Keefe/Smith]
|
9053
|
If there is a precise borderline area, that is not a case of vagueness
[Keefe/Smith]
|
6861
|
What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth?
[Williamson]
|
9602
|
Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness
[Williamson]
|
21630
|
If fuzzy edges are fine, then why not fuzzy temporal, modal or mereological boundaries?
[Williamson]
|
16220
|
Vagueness is either in our knowledge, in our talk, or in reality
[Hawley]
|
16222
|
Indeterminacy in objects and in properties are not distinct cases
[Hawley]
|
9132
|
An offer of 'free coffee or juice' could slowly shift from exclusive 'or' to inclusive 'or'
[Sorensen]
|
8944
|
Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom)
[Fisher]
|
18839
|
An object that is not clearly red or orange can still be red-or-orange, which sweeps up problem cases
[Rumfitt]
|
18838
|
The extension of a colour is decided by a concept's place in a network of contraries
[Rumfitt]
|
9389
|
Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members
[Rumfitt]
|