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Single Idea 14485
[filed under theme 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
]
Full Idea
I do not argue that ordinary objects are indispensable, but rather that they are (nearly) unavoidable.
Gist of Idea
Ordinary objects may be not indispensable, but they are nearly unavoidable
Source
Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 09)
Book Ref
Thomasson,Amie L.: 'Ordinary Objects' [OUP 2010], p.152
A Reaction
Disappointing, given the blurb and title of the book, but put in those terms it will be hard to disagree. Clearly ordinary objects figure in the most useful way for us to talk. I wonder whether we have a clear ontology of 'simples' in which they vanish.
The
21 ideas
from Amie L. Thomasson
21651
|
It is analytic that if simples are arranged chair-wise, then there is a chair
[Thomasson, by Hofweber]
|
14467
|
Ordinary objects are rejected, to avoid contradictions, or for greater economy in thought
[Thomasson]
|
14466
|
A chief task of philosophy is making reflective sense of our common sense worldview
[Thomasson]
|
14471
|
Analytical entailments arise from combinations of meanings and inference rules
[Thomasson]
|
14475
|
How can causal theories of reference handle nonexistence claims?
[Thomasson]
|
14474
|
Pure causal theories of reference have the 'qua problem', of what sort of things is being referred to
[Thomasson]
|
14476
|
Identity claims between objects are only well-formed if the categories are specified
[Thomasson]
|
14477
|
Identical entities must be of the same category, and meet the criteria for the category
[Thomasson]
|
14478
|
Modal Conventionalism says modality is analytic, not intrinsic to the world, and linguistic
[Thomasson]
|
14479
|
To individuate people we need conventions, but conventions are made up by people
[Thomasson]
|
14480
|
Maybe analytic truths do not require truth-makers, as they place no demands on the world
[Thomasson]
|
14481
|
Wherever an object exists, there are intrinsic properties instantiating every modal profile
[Thomasson]
|
14482
|
If the statue and the lump are two objects, they require separate properties, so we could add their masses
[Thomasson]
|
14483
|
Given the similarity of statue and lump, what could possibly ground their modal properties?
[Thomasson]
|
14485
|
Ordinary objects may be not indispensable, but they are nearly unavoidable
[Thomasson]
|
14486
|
Eliminativists haven't found existence conditions for chairs, beyond those of the word 'chair'
[Thomasson]
|
14487
|
The simple existence conditions for objects are established by our practices, and are met
[Thomasson]
|
14489
|
Theories do not avoid commitment to entities by avoiding certain terms or concepts
[Thomasson]
|
14488
|
Analyticity is revealed through redundancy, as in 'He bought a house and a building'
[Thomasson]
|
14491
|
Rival ontological claims can both be true, if there are analytic relationships between them
[Thomasson]
|
14493
|
Existence might require playing a role in explanation, or in a causal story, or being composed in some way
[Thomasson]
|